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The emergence of Basel III regulation to strengthen the international banking system 
was mainly attributed to the global financial crisis in 20072008. This crisis 
witnessed many banks particularly in developed economies experiencing excessive 
leverage, low capital, and inadequate liquidity buffer, have failed to survive. Hence, 
regulators believed the overall systematic risks in the financial system must be 
reduced by stricter regulations. Consequently, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) reconfigured the new regulation (Basel III) by increasing the 
capital and liquidity requirements of banks in order to make the financial system 
more resilient to future financial crises. However, concerns were raised whether this 
universal rule would be able to protect banks in emerging and less developed 
economies, particularly in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa). This thesis attempts to investigate how the capital adequacy and liquidity 
rules of Basel III affect the resilience of banks in the BRICS economies. Using panel 
data from 2007 – 2014, the empirical evidence of this thesis shows the Basel III 
standards significantly increase the resilience (as measured by the Z-Score) of banks. 
In particular, the results suggest a 10% increase in the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), 
Tier 1 capital ratio, and leverage ratio increases the resilience by about 2.51%, 
0.61%, and 1.2%, respectively. Similarly, for a 10% increase in the net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR), the resilience of banks increases by 0.11%, 0.09% and 0.18%, 
respectively in the models associated with CAR, Tier 1 capital ratio, and leverage 
ratio. Hence, the CAR is sufficiently robust to increase the resilience of banks. The 
findings of this thesis also reveal the NSFR and the leverage ratio are the most 
effective to increase the resilience of banks if implemented simultaneously. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis explores the impact of Basel III on the lending rate and GDP 
by applying panel regression models. The analysis demonstrates Basel III 
requirements add to the cost burden of the BRICS economies. It is found that holding 
additional capital and liquid assets increase the opportunity costs of banks. Thus, the 
extra costs are passed on to borrowers through increased lending rates. This banking 
behaviour reduces the investment flows into the economy resulting in a contraction 
in economic activities, which ultimately causes a negative impact on GDP. The 
xvii 
empirical evidence of this thesis shows a 10% increase in the Tier 1 capital ratio 
increases the lending rate of banks by about 1.1%, which is associated with a decline 
in GDP by about 0.45%, and for a 10% increase in the NSFR the lending rate 
increases by about 1.18% resulting in a 0.18% decline in GDP.  
 
This thesis also assesses the benefits of Basel III regulation by employing models 
provided by the BCBS. The Basel III literature articulates tighter capital and liquidity 
regulation would reduce the probability of crises occurring in the implementing 
countries, and hence, the output (GDP) would be protected which otherwise would 
have been lost in the event of a crisis. The empirical evidence of this thesis shows an 
improved capital and liquidity requirement reduces the probability of a crisis and 
increases the gain in GDP. For a 10% increase in Tier 1 capital ratio, the probability 
a crisis occurring reduces by 5.03% resulting in a gain in GDP of about 1.54%. In 
effect, the net benefits of Basel III are positive for the BRICS economies. For 
instance, a 10% increase in Tier 1 capital ratio provides a net benefit of 1.10% in 
terms of increasing in GDP and for a 10% increase in NSFR, the net benefits 
increase by about 0.24%. However, the outcome of this thesis suggests the net 
benefits are achieved up to a certain level of additional capital requirements, beyond 
which the marginal benefits are negative. Thus, there is an optimum level of capital 
enhancement where the benefits are maximised. In summary, Basel III regulation is 
effective to increase the resilience of banks. The regulation increases GDP albeit 
with some macroeconomic costs. Nevertheless, the benefits are greater than the 
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Banks around the world are highly sensitive to various risks such as credit, market 
and operational risks. Banking risks have increased substantially with the increase in 
financial market volatility and fluctuations (Habib et al., 2012; Delahaye, 2011). In 
addition, as banks mostly operate on leverage, exposure to risks intensifies the losses 
to banks, which may cause a bank to fail. That is why; risk management has become 
extremely important to safeguard banks against financial crises (Hossain, 2012).  
 
As such, in order to increase the "safety and soundness" (BCBS, 2004, Part. 4, 
Clause 811) of globally active banks, the BCBS provides regulatory guidelines, 
which are commonly referred to as "Basel Regulation". In fact, the BCBS is a 
committee of banking supervisory authorities, which was formed in 1974 by the 
leaders of the central banks of the then G-10 countries (BIS, 2014). Although the 
policy prescriptions of the BCBS are voluntary and have no legal force, 140 central 
bank regulators have endorsed the Basel III Accord (BIS, 2014), which makes the 
Basel III a de facto global regulation for banks. The BCBS aims to increase cross-
border cooperation and introduce financial discipline through banking regulation, 
particularly by setting capital standards for banks (BIS, 2014). 
 
The first set of regulations for banks, the 'Basel I' Accord was introduced in 1988 
(BCBS, 1988). However, Basel I focused only on credit risk, whilst other risks such 
as market and operational risks were ignored. Considering the importance of market 
and operational risks, the BCBS introduced a new set of standards in 2004, which 
was referred as the Basel II Accord (BCBS, 2004). However, the Basel II Accord 
clearly proved to be incapable of protecting banks from the global financial crisis of 
2007/08 ("Financial Crisis
1
") (Lall, 2009; Cannata and Quagliariello, 2009; Vallascas 
and Keasey, 2012). 
                                                          
1
 This thesis uses the term Financial Crisis in order to denote the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
2 
The financial crisis revealed banks should have robust risk management techniques 
and they should build capacity to withstand severe disasters (Elizalde, 2007). The 
foremost reason identified for the failure of banks during the 2007-2008 crises was 
securitisation
2
. Although securitization is deemed a high-risk transaction, Basel II 
rated it as a low-risk exposure. This allowed banks to lower the capital requirements 
even when involved in high-risk securitised transactions (Meissner, 2005). In 
addition, subordinated debt
3
 was treated as a component of capital under Basel II. 
However, it was in fact, a debt instrument and was incapable of absorbing losses, 
which could have been more effectively accomplished by equity capital in the event 
of a crisis. Besides, when the market became illiquid during the financial crisis, 
banks could neither sell the securities nor manage funds from the market, which 
resulted in a severe dearth of liquidity. 
 
Holding liquidity was not addressed in Basel II, as a result, banks did not have 
enough liquidity to support their transactions, which subsequently resulted in bank 
failures. To remedy the situation, the BCBS came up with Basel III in 2010 (BCBS, 
2011). The new regulation aimed to create a safer banking system through the 
rectification of the various flaws that were observed in the financial catastrophe of 
2007/08. The new regulation is supposed to strengthen the banking sectors by 
enhancing the capital and liquidity requirements, which would produce 
macroeconomic benefits by reducing the future probability of crises (Barrell et al., 
2009; BCBS, 2010a; MAG, 2010a; Kato et al., 2010; Dorich and Zhang, 2012). 
However, due to deleveraging and tighter capital and liquidity requirements, the 
economy would incur some costs in the short-run. For instance, banks would 
preferably transfer the costs of holding additional capital and liquidity to borrowers 
by increasing the lending rate or spread
4
. This could eventually reduce the credit 
supply in the economy having a negative impact on the economic performance and 
output (Barrell et al., 2009; MAG 2010a; BCBS 2010a; Yan et al., 2012). 
 
                                                          
2
 Securitisation is the process of converting illiquid assets such as loans of banks into securities, which 
is subsequently sold to the general investors. If those securities are backed (secured) by mortgage, it is 
referred as mortgage-backed securities. 
 
3
 Subordinated debt is a debt or an obligation of bank, which would be repaid after other obligations 




 Spread is defined as the deference between lending rate and deposit rate. 
3 
A study by BCBS (2010a) shows historically a banking crisis occurs in a given 
country every 20 to 25 years, hence, the average annual probability of a crisis varies 
from 4% to 5% and the discounted output loss ranges from 20% to 100% of pre-
crisis GDP. However, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) have reported 34 banking crises in 
the BCBS member countries over a period of 25 years, whilst Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) have found only 24 crises in the same countries over the same period, 
meaning that the annual probability of a banking crisis in a given country varies from 
3.6% to 5.2%. Specifically, in the context of emerging market economies, the annual 
probability of a crisis fluctuates from 4% to 5% (Walter, 2010). The Basel III 
regulation, in fact, would help reduce this frequency of crises and ensure a higher 
welfare in the absence of banking crises by preventing GDP losses. 
 
Indisputably, financial regulations are a critical prerequisite for crises resolution and 
for the establishment of economic stimulus (Besley, 2006). The BCBS (2010a) 
argued a healthy banking system would be less prone to crises with immense 
macroeconomic effects in terms of forgone GDP. As such, compliance with the 
Basel III Accord is indispensable for emerging market economies (EMEs) including 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), if they intend to increase 
their sovereign rating, which would ultimately reduce the costs of sovereign 
debt/loans (Taylor, 2010). This would ultimately facilitate the BRICS to keep pace 
with the economic incentives (Besley, 2006). 
 
1.2 Statement of Problem  
Attention has been placed on the BRICS economies as these economies have now 
started to dominate the global economy in terms of trade, banking and mobilization 
of resources (O'Neill, 2001; Faulconbridge, 2008; Morazán et al., 2012). These five 
economies combined represent a substantial proportion of the world economy; their 
combined GDP has been about 20% of the gross world product (IMF, 2013). In 
addition, the BRICS have established a multilateral development bank known as the 
"New Development Bank" (NDB), which acts as a substitute for the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to establish greater 
strategic cooperation within the BRICS countries on common economic 
developments (Yarygina, 2015). In addition, the arrangement of a contingency 
4 
reserve plan would perform like the IMF, which grants temporary short-term bailout 
funds to the economies confronting capital flight and currency crises (Venu, 2014). 
 
The BRICS also have contributed tremendously to the economic development of the 
world (IMF, 2011; Lin, 2012) through trade relations with other low-income 
countries, which has accounted for 60% of total world imports (Morazán et al., 
2012). Foroohar (2009) has stated the GDP of BRICS might surpass the G7 
economies by 2027. The integration of the BRICS economies to other national and 
regional economies would certainly affect the greater world economy, if the BRICS 
economies were to fail (Banerjee and Vashisth, 2010; Schuman, 2014; Venu, 2014). 
Hence, the health of this economic group is very crucial to maintain the well-being of 
the world economy. 
 
The BRICS did experience an indirect consequence of the financial crisis (Banerjee 
and Vashisth, 2010) resulting in a slower economic growth, which in turn, had a 
spill-over effect to other low-income countries (Morazán et al., 2012). Therefore, it is 
important to protect the BRICS economies by prescribing financial regulations like 
the Basel III. 
 
However, the issue is whether a universal accord, such as Basel III and its 
standardised stipulations are appropriate, and would not impose undue burdens on 
the BRICS economies (Abdel-Baki, 2012; AfDB
5
, 2012). Will those requirements be 
essential for the BRICS economies since their financial systems are relatively 
shallow and, unlike the US and the UK, unexposed to enormous market risks (Abdel-
Baki, 2012; AfDB, 2012)? Therefore, a legitimate question arises as to how pertinent 
is the reform package of the Basel III to the BRICS and what would be the 
macroeconomic impact of the tighter regulation on the BRICS economies? 
 
1.3 Motivation for Undertaking the Study 
The recipe of risk management under the Basel II framework raised a lot of debate 
among policy makers and practitioners after the financial crisis (Lall, 2009). The 
severity and the consequences of the financial crisis brought the issue of financial 
                                                          
5
 AfDB stands for African Development Bank 
5 
sector stability and the strengthening of banks to the top of the agenda of 
policymakers and banking supervisory authorities, particularly in implementing the 
Basel III norms. In fact, Basel III intends to raise the resilience of banking systems to 
future economic shocks by strengthening the regulatory standards for holding 
adequate capital and liquidity (BCBS, 2011). This regulation is likely to "ensure a 
level playing field" (BIS, 2014, p. 1) in all the banking operations across the world. 
One question to be considered will be the extent to which this universally binding 
regulation is appropriate for the already highly regulated emerging market 
economies, particularly the BRICS (Abdel-Baki, 2012; AfDB, 2012). Moreover, the 
financial system of the BRICS is relatively healthier than in the US and EU markets, 
(Abdel-Baki, 2012; AfDB, 2012; Watanagase, 2012). Hence, the question is whether 
the Basel III regulation is relevant for the BRICS economies. 
 
In addition, the debate is most empirical investigations on the Basel III regulation 
focus on the needs of advanced economies (Suttle et al., 2010). Hence, the 
circumstances of the BRICS and emerging market economies have been overlooked 
(Suttle et al., 2010) though the BRICS economies have also suffered from the 
consequences of the global financial crisis of 2007/08 (Banerjee and Vashisth, 2010). 
Therefore, it is vital to examine the impact of Basel III, particularly to test the 
solvency (resilience) of banks in the BRICS economies. 
 
Importantly, the role of BRICS in the global financial market as an emerging 
protagonist is significant and changing rapidly (BBVA
6
, 2012; Morazán, et al., 
2012). The sustainability of world economic development is largely attributed by the 
BRICS (IMF, 2011; Lin, 2012). Trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and 
development financing have also contributed significantly to the economic 
development of low-income countries (Morazán, et al., 2012), which has minimised 
the impact of the financial crisis on those economies (Banerjee and Vashisth, 2010).  
 
Apart from this, literature shows the Basel III would lessen the likelihood of crises 
occurring in the economy by holding adequate capital and liquidity by the banking 
sector (Barrell et al., 2009; Kato et al., 2010; MAG, 2010a). If a crisis does not strike 
                                                          
6
 BBVA is a research based organisation in UK. 
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the economy by means of increasing capital, GDP will be saved, which is one of the 
benefits of tighter regulations. During the crisis period of 2007/08, the GDP growth 
of China and India declined to 5% from 6% whilst the growth rate of Russia declined 
to roughly -10% and the GDP growth was also negative for the economy of Brazil  
(-0.50%) (Banerjee and Vashisth, 2010). Therefore, it is imperative to assess the 
economic benefits that may be derived by the BRICS through the implementation of 
the Basel III regulation. 
 
On the other hand, the Basel III regulation makes the financing costly by increasing 
the opportunity costs of holding higher capital (Osborne et al., 2010; Gambacorta 
and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). The resulting effects are limited credit requests by 
borrowers, and contraction of economic activity. Thus, Basel III would also have a 
negative impact on the economic performance of the BRICS, which needs empirical 
investigation. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The Basel III Accord is a new regulation for banks, which has been developed in 
response to the financial crisis. Although the regulation has been designed to protect 
banks, researchers put less focus on the situations faced by developing countries 
including the BRICS (Suttle et al., 2010). There may be unintended consequences of 
the Basel III regulation on the BRICS, which merits empirical investigation. 
Therefore, the broad objective of this thesis is to measure the impending impact of 
the Basel III guidelines on the BRICS economies. 
 
The specific objectives of the thesis are: 
 
(i) to assess the resilience of banks due to increased capital and liquidity 
requirements;  
(ii) to understand the impact of Basel III compliance on the loan pricing of banks; 
and 
(iii) to measure the macroeconomic costs and benefits of Basel III regulation in 




1.5 Significance of the Study 
This thesis estimates the resilience of banks considering the enhanced capital and 
liquidity requirements under the Basel III proposal and also shows how the different 
types of capital such as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital ratio, 
leverage ratio, and liquidity ratios (liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR)) ensure the solvency of banks. This would be particularly 
interesting for banks and regulators for specifying target capital ratios that need 
greater attention. 
 
The BCBS postulates capital and liquidity would increase the lending rate of banks 
(Angelini et al., 2011). The outcome of this thesis proves those hypotheses of the 
BCBS and it contributes to the methodological aspects of the loan-pricing model by 
incorporating the capital and liquidity ratios into the model. Importantly, previous 
studies (Elliott 2009; Caggiano and Calice, 2011; Slovik and Cournède, 2011; and 
Santos and Elliott, 2012) have only included the costs of fund, administrative costs, 
and costs of capital proxied by ROE in the loan-pricing model where the assumptions 
of the BCBS are missing.  
 
Moreover, the estimates of the costs and benefits of Basel III regulation provide 
important lessons as to the net benefits, which are likely to be achieved up to a 
certain capital level, after which the benefits are negative. Hence, regulators would 
be able to set an optimum target-capital-ratio for banks in such a way as to increase 
the net benefits in terms of increasing GDP. Eventually, the results of this thesis 
would attract interest from quite a few stakeholders including the central banks, 
regulators, policy makers, practitioners, and financial economists. It would help 
formulate specific and tailor-made policies for banks in order to contain the 
systematic crises, which would ultimately ensure the economic growth. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
In order to aid readers of this thesis, each chapter has been inscribed in such a 
manner that it is more or less self-contained. Thus, some unavoidable repetition 
might occur in relevant materials between chapters, figures and tables. The 
remaining part of the thesis is organised as follows. The evolution of the Basel 
regulation is provided in Chapter 2. The detailed review of previous relevant studies 
8 
is summarised in Chapter 3 while the empirical models and methodology employed 
are described in Chapter 4. The detailed analysis of the empirical models and 
findings are discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks, 





Evolution of Basel Accord 
 
This chapter highlights the evolution of the Basel Accords and is organised as 
follows. Section 2.1 explains the background of the Basel Committee and Basel 
Accords. Section 2.2 presents the Basel I regulatory norms while Section 2.3 
provides the principles of Basel II. The latest regulatory proposals of the Basel III are 
described in Section 2.4 after which, Section 2.5 clarifies the Pillars of Basel III to 
withstand credit, market, operational, and liquidity risks. Section 2.6 portrays a 
summary of the comparison between Basel II and Basel III Accords whilst  
Section 2.7 shows the road map of Basel III implementation. Finally, Section 2.8 
concludes the chapter 
 
2.1 An Overview 
After the abolition of the Bretton Woods System
7
 of managed exchange rates in 
1973, banks incurred substantial losses because of taking excessive exposures to 
foreign currencies. Many banks' foreign currency exposure became three/four times 
higher than their capital, which resulted in significant losses on the unsettled 
transactions (BIS, 2014).  
 
Consequently, in the event of international financial market turmoil, the central bank 
Governors of the then G-10 countries formed a committee known as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1974 to promulgate banking 
regulations and to supervise those policy regulations (BIS, 2014; Goodhart, 2011). 
The policy regulations of the BCBS are commonly referred to as „Basel Regulation‟. 
The major focus of the BCBS was on collaboration amongst the central banks in 
                                                          
7
 Bretton Woods System is an international monetary system, which was established by the agreement 
of 44 members of the IMF in 1944 during a conference held in Breton Woods, New Hampshire. 
Under this system, all countries fixed their exchange rates in terms of the U.S. dollar and the U.S 
dollar was fixed to the price of gold at $35 per ounce. As per the agreement, countries kept their 
currencies fixed but adjustable within ∓1 percent to the dollar. After the abolition of the Bretton 
Woods, IMF member countries could adopt any form of exchange arrangement except pegging to 
gold, such as, free float, pegging to another currency/basket of currencies or adopting another 
currency. 
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order to ensure financial stability and to increase the efficiency of international 
banking and the monetary system (Toniolo, 2005).  
 
At the very outset, the Basel regulations were issued to increase cooperation among 
the member countries. However, 140 regulators (central banks) are now following 
the prescriptions of the BCBS (BIS, 2014). Thus, the Basel regulations have become 
an international convergence of capital and liquidity standard for banks (BCBS, 
2013). Although the policy prescriptions of the BCBS are voluntary and have no 
legal enforce (BCBS, 1996; BIS, 2014), internationally active banks across the world 
follow the supervisory guidelines of the BCBS because Basel regulations provide a 
comprehensive risk management recipe to the banks (BCBS, 2004). In effect, the risk 
management capabilities of banks widely increased by the compliance with the Basel 
regulations. 
 
2.2 Basel I 
The first set of regulations, the Basel I, came into effect in 1988 with the aim of 
strengthening the stability and soundness of the international banking system by 
managing the capital of banks (BCBS, 1988). In line with the Basel I regulation, 
globally banks were required to maintain capital of at least 8% of total credit risk-
weighted assets (BCBS, 1988). Thus, Basel I exclusively focused on the credit risk 
though there were other risks in the banking business such as, market and operational 
risks. There was no recognition of risks related to the term-structure of credit 
portfolio. Moreover, the regulation recognised neither portfolio diversification 
effects of credit risk nor credit risk mitigation/the role of collateral. In fact, there 
were inadequate differentiations of credit risk because Basel I proposed few risk 
weights for exposures of banks, i.e., 0%, 20%, 50% and 100%. In particular, the 
Basel I Accord did not differentiate SMEs from corporate or AAA from BBB rated 
entities, that is, it followed a one-size fits all approach. 
 
Hence, Basel I was amended by the BCBS in 1996 in order to incorporate market 
risk (BCBS, 1996). In that amendment the BCBS stated "as from the end of 1997, or 
earlier if their supervisory authority so prescribes, banks will be required to measure 
and apply capital charges in respect of their market risks in addition to their credit 
11 
risks" (BCBS, 1996, p. 1). Thus, from 1997 onwards, banks were required to 
calculate minimum capital requirements considering credit and market risks. 
However, operational risk of banks remained unrecognized by the Basel I Accord. 
As a result, the capital adequacy was less secure and vulnerable to define the banks' 
financial health and resilience. Therefore, the risk management capacity of Basel I 
was very poor and it became necessary to revise the Basel I Accord. 
 
2.3 Basel II 
Subsequently, in addressing the weaknesses of Basel I, the Basel II Accord was 
developed in 2004 as the new regulation for banks. This regulation (Basel II) was 
more practical and comprehensive from a risk management perspective. The Basel II 
regulation consisted of three Pillars (BCBS, 2011). Pillar I (first pillar) was the 
minimum capital requirement (MCR), which was the improved version of the 
previous Accord. Pillar I required banks to focus on credit, market, and operational 
risks in order to calculate the minimum capital requirements (MCR): 
 
    
                   (                 )
    8
                               (   ) 
 
While calculating the minimum capital requirement under Pillar I, banks could apply 
a number of methodologies. In assessing credit risk-weighted assets for example, 
Basel II recommended three methodologies which were, the Standardized Approach 
(SA), Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach (IRB), and Advanced IRB 
Approach. In the market risk measurement the Standardized Approach (SA) and 
Internal Model Approach (IMA) were followed by banks. Likewise, in assessing 
operational risks, banks were allowed to use the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), 
Standardized Approach (SA), and Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA). 
 
Pillar II of Basel II, was the supervisory review process where risks were identified 
and assessed apart from the risk in Pillar I in a wider perspective. Under Pillar II, 
national regulators imposed additional capital charge if any material risk was found 
other than the credit, market, and operational risks. For example, regulators could 
                                                          
8
 TRWA represents total risk-weighted assets for credit, market and operational risks. 
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impose additional capital charge for residual risk, reputation risk, concentration risk, 
etc. Hence, the capital requirements for risks under Pillar II were additional to the 
capital calculated under Pillar I. The Pillar III of Basel II was all about market 
disclosures, that is, banks were required to disclose all the material information, 
market outlook and risks exposure to stakeholders, the public, and in the market in 
order to make the financial market more transparent and resilient (BCBS, 2004). 
 
Principally, the Basel committee focused on the capital base, which is assumed to 
safeguard banks in the event of unexpected banking losses. In Basel II, the BCBS 
announced three tiers of capital; Tier 1 Capital or Core Capital composed of the 
highest quality capital elements. The components include paid up capital, non-
repayable share premium account, statutory reserves, general reserves, retained 
earnings, minority interest in subsidiaries, non-cumulative irredeemable preference 
shares and dividend equalization account (BCBS, 2004).  
 
Tier 2 capital or Supplementary Capital represents other capital instruments, in 
which some of the attributes of the Core Capital are missing but contribute to the 
overall strength and soundness of a bank. These elements include general provisions, 
asset revaluation reserves, all other preference shares, exchange equalization account, 
revaluation reserves for securities and subordinated debts (BCBS, 2004). 
 
Apart from the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, Tier 3 capital was a new type of capital in 
the Basel II, which was treated as “additional supplementary capital”. Tier 3 capital 
or additional supplementary capital consisted of short-term subordinated debt 
(original/residual maturity less than or equal to five years but greater than or equal to 
two years). This capital could solely be used to cover market risks capital charge 
arising from the risk in trading book, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity 
prices. According to the norms of Basel II, the amount of Tier 2 capital was limited 
to 100% of the Tier 1 capital and the support for market risks from the Tier 3 capital, 
was limited up to the maximum of 250% of Tier 1 capital
9
 in order to ensure a robust 
shock absorbent and risk resilient banking system (BCBS, 2004). 
 
                                                          
9
 Tier 1 capital was calculated after meeting the credit risk capital requirements. 
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With respect to Basel I, Basel II was appropriately sensitive to the degree of risk 
because it assigned diversified risk weights to different exposures. Although the 
approach of Basel II was very comprehensive in addressing banking risks, it could 
not protect banks from the severe crisis in 2007/08. However, the question arises as 
to why the Basel II failed. There is a broad consensus among economists, regulators 
and practitioners about the fundamentals of Basel II failure, which are given in the 
following sections: 
 
Table 2.1: Minimum Risk Weights of Assets in the Basel II Accord for 
Corporations (to be multiplied by 8%) 
 
 AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BB- Below BB- Unrated 
Corporations 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Source: BCBS (2004) 
 
(i) Table 2.1 shows the unrated risk weights are lower than the lowest graded 
clients are. This indicates banks would not encourage financially weak 
corporate clients to be rated to gain benefit from the lowest risk weight 
bracket because it relieves banks from the higher capital charge. Thus, banks 
finance many projects or clients, whose risk rating were very high. This put 
the banks' survival in an extremely vulnerable situation. 
 
(ii) Basel II gave recognition of internal ratings for large banks in the Advanced 
Internal Rating Based (Advanced IRB) approach. Primarily, in the draft 
proposal of Basel II, the BCBS proposed to introduce a capital charge for 
dealing with derivatives; in the Basel literature, it is called the 'W factor'. 
However, the committee dropped the so-called 'W factor' in the final 
recommendation of Basel II. As such, due to the lower risk weights, banks 
could lower capital requirements on the exposure of trading books, even 
though the trading book exposures are extremely risky (Meissner, 2005).  
 
(iii) Apart from this, in order to assess market risk, the BCBS had a plan in the 
draft proposal of Basel II to introduce a standardised methodology based on a 
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fixed risk parameter but the Committee substituted standardised methods and 
recognised the Value-at-Risk (VaR) model for measuring the market risk 
(Lall, 2009). This created an opportunity to underestimate the potential risks. 
 
(iv) In addition, the BCBS had a plan in the draft proposal to assign risk weights 
on securitised (subprime mortgage) transactions. However, later on, the 
Committee introduced lower risk weights for rated tranches and allowed for 
greater use of internal ratings. In internal ratings (Foundation IRB approach), 
banks mostly depend on historical default rates which is not an accurate 
predictor of future default rates (Meissner, 2005). Thus, the BCBS allowed 
banks to calculate their own capital requirements based on their own models. 
 
(v) Moreover, in the event of a crisis such as the subprime mortgage crisis, assets 
that were not correlated previously tended to be correlated and generated 
larger financial losses than anticipated (Meissner, 2005). Internal ratings gave 
banks an opportunity to decrease capital requirements without lowering risks.  
Therefore, these treatments for market risks and securitisation caused the 
Basel II to fail to provide a very comprehensive approach to risk management 
in the global financial crisis of 2007/08. Another weakness of the Basel II 
was in the definition of capital. The regulator considered subordinate debt as 
a component of Tier 3 capital, but it did not give sufficient support during the 
financial crisis due to the fact that debt instruments are liabilities for banks.  
 
2.4 Basel III 
Under these circumstances, Basel III
10
 emerged in 2010. The detail Basel III 
framework is provided in Appendix 2.1. This regulation is an upgraded version of 
Basel II, and globally, banks have started to implement the Basel III norms from 
2013 (Gatzert and Wesker, 2011). The motivation of the Basel III regulation is to 
increase the financial stability of international banks in order to withstand future 
economic and financial crises, including the effects of financial contagions by 
                                                          
10
 Before the Basel III framework was finally proposed, enhancement to Basel II (popularly known as 
Basel 2.5) was introduced in 2009. In this document, the BCBS enhanced the regulatory framework of 
Basel II in the area of securitisation and more specifically for dealing with resecuritisations. In fact, 
the new capital requirement was introduced to regulate exposures in the Trading Books (see BCBS, 
2009). 
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improving the transparency and market disclosures of capital base. There are many 
novel ideas in the Basel III regulation, such as a focus on the quality and quantity of 
regulatory capital; tighter liquidity requirements; a non-risk-based leverage ratio; risk 
coverage under stress scenario; a capital conservation buffer, a counter cyclical 
capital buffer, and restrictions on systematically important banks and financial 
institutions (Gatzert and Wesker, 2011). The salient features of Basel III are 
presented below: 
 
(i) The new regulation redefined the capital requirement, which is much tighter 
than the previous Basel II regulation. Banks are now required to maintain 
more reserves starting from January 1, 2015, where Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET 1) (common shares and retained earnings) requirements were raised 
from 2% to 4.5%. The BCBS also increased the mandatory Tier 1 capital
11
 
requirement from 4% to 6% and this has been implemented by the banks 
since 2015. 
 
(ii) Basel III has introduced a new type of capital known as 'capital conservation 
buffer' (CCB). The capital conservation buffer is 2.5%, which is an additional 
capital reserve (buffer) to withstand future periods of stress. The buffer would 
bring the Total Common Equity Tier 1 capital requirement to 7% (from 4.5% 
of CET 1). The aim of building an additional buffer is to "strengthen the 
resilience of the banking sector" so that banks can use those capital stocks in 
times of stress. The phase-in has commenced from January 1, 2016, and 
would be complete by January 1, 2019. Importantly, the capital conservation 
buffer (CCB) must be fulfilled by the CET 1 capital after deductions (BCBS, 
2011).  
 
(iii)The new Basel III norms require national regulators not only to ensure the 
compliance of banks with the Basel III requirements but also to regulate the 
credit volume in the economy. If the credit volume increases faster than the 
GDP, regulators may increase the capital requirement for the systematically 
important banks by increasing Countercyclical Buffers, which varies from 
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 Tier 1 capital comprises common equity Tier 1 and additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital components. 
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0% to 2.5% (BCBS, 2011). If banks breach to build this buffer, a certain 
percentages of earnings must be retained, as outlined in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Retention of Earnings when Countercyclical Buffer Breaches 
 
Minimum Capital Conservation Buffer 
(when subject to 2.5% countercyclical capital requirement for individual bank) 
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
Minimum Capital Preservation Ratio 
(as percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.75% 100% 
> 5.75% - 7.0% 80% 
> 7.0% - 8.25% 60% 
> 8.25% - 9.5% 40% 
> 9.5% 0% 
Source: BCBS (2011) 
 
(iv) As the Tier 3 or additional supplementary capital of Basel II (subordinate 
debt) did not protect banks in the recent financial crisis, it has been abolished 
from the Basel III capital regulation. Thus, the subordinate debt would not be 
considered a component of capital under the Basel III norms. 
 
(v) In securitisation transactions and in off-balance sheet exposures, banks built 
up extremely high levels of leverage which was a prime cause of financial 
losses during the most recent global financial crisis. Thus, the Basel III has 
introduced a leverage ratio to restrict leverage in the banking sector. The 
leverage ratio is calculated as: 
 
               
              
            
                                                                 (   ) 
  
The ratio must be at least 3% of total assets. The total assets would be 
calculated taking the balance sheet assets and 10% of off-balance sheet 
exposures and this would not be risk-based. Thus, the capital requirement 
would be supplemented by a non-risk-based leverage ratio (Metha, 2012). 
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Min (total expected cash 
inflows; 75% of total 
expected cash outflows) 
Researchers, academicians and regulators believe this ratio would certainly 
give protection against "model risk and measurement error"
12
 (BCBS, 2011). 
In effect, the leverage ratio would be implemented from 2017.  
 
(vi) Taking lessons from the global financial crisis, Basel III has also introduced 
liquidity requirements, namely, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net 
stable funding ratio (NSFR) (BCBS, 2013). The liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR) takes the following form and must be equal to or greater than 100 
percent: 
 
    
            
                                                      






The stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) represents 'level 1 assets' and 
'level 2 assets'. The 'level 1 assets' as defined by BCBS (2013a) includes 
cash; central bank reserves; marketable securities representing claims on or 
guarantees by sovereigns, central banks, IMF, non-central bank public sector 
entities, etc; and debt securities issued by sovereigns or central banks. The 
'level 2 assets' represent marketable securities subject to 20% risk-weights as 
per the definition of the BCBS and corporate bonds rated AA- and above. 
Thus, the LCR is a short-term liquidity indicator and requires banks to 
provide sufficient liquidity in a one-month horizon in the form of 
'unencumbered high-quality assets' in order to survive in a severe liquidity 
stress scenario (BCBS, 2011; BCBS, 2013a; BCBS, 2015). The 
implementation of the LCR has already been started from 2015.  
 
 
                                                          
12
 Model risk and measurement error arises when a financial model is used to measure a bank's risk 
but the model fails to capture the risks involved or may have errors in measuring it.  Kiema and 
Jokivuolle (2014) argued that severe model risks associated with low-risk loans reduce banks' stability 
or resilience. 
The total net cash 
outflows over the next 
30 calendar days 
= 
 




(vii) The second liquidity measure, net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is calculated 
as follows: 
 
     
                              
                             
                                         (   ) 
 
The ratio is calculated over a period of a one-year horizon (BCBS, 2014). 
The motivation of incorporating the NSFR is to protect banks by limiting 
dependence on short-term funding and increase the base of long-term 
funding sources in order to ensure the resilience of banks and the banking 
system (BCBS, 2011; BCBS, 2013a; BCBS, 2015). The purpose of 
introducing the NSFR is to ensure at least a minimum funding from the 
more stable liabilities of the transactions in investment banking, off-balance 
sheet exposures, securitisation, etc. (BCBS, 2013). In fact, it is introduced 
to minimize the funding risk arising from the mismatch between assets and 
liabilities (King, 2013). Therefore, Basel III aspires banks will have an 
enormous amount of liquidity to withstand the crises period in a situation of 
serious liquidity disruptions. Even if, banks incur losses due to any 




2.5 Pillars of Basel III to Withstand Credit, Market, Operational, and Liquidity 
Risks 
As mentioned earlier, Basel III is an upgraded version of the Basel II regulation. In 
fact, "Basel III was remodelled to supplement the Basel II rather than supplant it" 
(Hazarika and Dubey, 2014, p. 1). Basel II consisted of three pillars (Pillar I, Pillar II, 
and Pillar III), which were redesigned and strengthened (especially Pillar I with 
enhanced minimum capital and liquidity requirements) with the pillars of Basel III 
by addressing the situation in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The following 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the enhanced framework of Basel III looks like compared 




Figure 2.1: Enhanced Pillars of Basel III 
 
Source: Irwin (2011) 
 
The Basel III framework appears much stronger than the Basel II Accord. The newly 
introduced forward-looking approach of the model would help better manage a 
system-wide risk and the new disclosure requirements would likely make the 
financial markets more transparent. The three pillars of Basel III were designed in 
such a manner as to consider both the micro and macro aspects of risk management 
in banks. Table 2.3 provides a more precise picture of the three pillars of Basel III. 
 
Table 2.3: Novel Key Elements in the Pillars of Basel III for Withstanding 
Credit, Market, Operational, and Liquidity Risks 
Risk 
Category 
Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III 















 Introduction of quality capital 
( Tier 1 & Tier 2); 
 Raised minimum 
requirements of  Tier 1 
capital to 4.5% of RWA 
 
Risk Coverage: 
 Counter party credit risk; 
 Risks in exposures to central 
counterparties (CCPs). 
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Table 2.3: (Continued) 
Risk 
Category 
Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III 















 Introduction of capital 
conservation buffer (CCB) of 
2.5% of RWA; 
 Introduction of counter 




 Extensively higher capital for 
trading book and derivatives 
exposures; 
 Incorporation of stressed 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
modelling to mitigate pro-
cyclicality. 
 





 Management of 
large exposures and 
concentration risk; 
 Stress testing and 
simulations; 
 Managing Portfolio 
& limits; 
 Interest rate risk in 


























 Strengthening the treatment 
of capital for securitisation 
and resecuritisations. Banks 
are required to conduct more 




 A non-risk-based leverage 
ratio serves as an additional 
safeguard along with the 
risk-based capital 
requirement. Also controls 
system-wide creation of 
leverage. 
 
 Giving incentives to 
better manage risk 










 Contingency funding 
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Table 2.3: (Continued) 
Risk 
Category 
Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III 
Capital and Risk Coverage 















Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
 
 Requires bank to ensure high 
quality liquid assets in a 30-
day stress scenario. 
 
Net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR) 
 
 Requires bank to use stable 





















Source: Based on Hazarika and Dubey (2014) and various BCBS documents 
 
Therefore, Basel III has been finalised by many prudent policy efforts. This 
regulation has been amended and modified from time to time to address the relevant 
risks by incorporating pragmatic risk management tools, which are forward-looking 
in nature. In order to provide a snapshot of the important dates when an amendment 
and/or a new set of rules was incorporated, a pictorial view of the evolution of Basel 
III is depicted in the following timeline (Figure-2.2). 
 

























































































2.6 Basel II and Basel III Compared 
Many similarities have been observed between the Basel II and Basel III regulations, 
such as recognition of risks under Pillar I and Pillar II, and the methodology of 
minimum capital calculation. However, there are some aspects where Basel III 
differs from Basel II. A comparative analysis of the two regulations has been 
summarised in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4: Comparisons between Basel II and Basel III Regulations 
Ratios Basel II Basel III 
Capital Requirements 





                            











(Common equity after 
deductions) 
Implementation schedule is 
as follows 
(Before 2013 = 2%, 
1
st
 January 2013 = 3.5%, 
1
st
 January 2014 = 4%, 
1
st
 January 2015 = 4.5%) 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
 
                    






Total Capital Ratio = Capital Adequacy 
Ratio (CAR) 
 
                             








Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB) 







(Before 2016 = 0%, 
1
st
 January 2016=0.625%, 
1
st
 January 2017 =1.25%, 
1
st
 January 2018 = 1.875%, 
1
st
 January 2019 = 2.5%) 
This Table is continued on the next page 
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Table 2.4: (Continued) 
Ratios Basel II Basel III 
Capital Requirements   
Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
There is no 
Countercyclical 
Capital Buffer 
0% – 2.5% 
(Depends on the 
macroeconomic situations. 
Phase in has been started 
since January 2016. The 
full implementation will be 
enforced from January 
2019) 
Phase in schedule is as 
follows: 
(Before 2016 = 0%,  
1
st
 January 2016 = 0.625%, 
1
st
 January 2017 = 1.25%, 
1
st
 January 2018 = 1.875%, 
1
st
 January 2019 = 2.5%) 
Leverage requirement  
Leverage Ratio 
 
              
              
 




Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
 
                         
                            
                         
 




Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)  
 
                                  
                                 
 




Source: BCBS (2004), BCBS (2011) BCBS (2013a) and BCBS (2014) 
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Table 2.4 demonstrates the minimum requirement for common equity capital (the 
highest quality capital), which has been increased from 2% to 4.5%. The overall  
Tier 1 capital requirement (CET 1
13
 plus AT 1
14
) has also been raised from 4% to 6%. 
While the minimum total capital requirement will remain at the current level of 8%, 
when combined with the capital conservation buffer (CCB), the total requirement 
would increase to 10.5% as prescribed in the Basel III regulation.  
 
2.7 Road Map of Basel III Implementation 
Globally, the implementation of the new rules of Basel III began in 2013 and is 
scheduled to be fully implemented by 2019
15
. In order to illustrate the complete 
execution phase, a road map is depicted in Table 2.5. 
 









equity capital ratio 
2% 2% 3.5% 4% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Capital conservation 
buffer 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.625% 1.25% 1.875% 2.5% 
Minimum common 
equity plus capital 
conservation buffer 
2% 2% 3.5% 4% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.0% 
Phase-in of 
deductions 
0% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
Minimum Tier 1 
capital ratio 
4% 4% 4.5% 5.5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Minimum total 
capital ratio 




8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.5% 
 
Source: BCBS (2011) and Latham and Watkins (2011) 
                                                          
13
 CET 1 comprises common equity and retained earnings. 
14
 AT 1 refers to other qualifying financial instruments which have the common equity attributes. 
15
 The new standards will be fully enforced from 2019. However, banks will be allowed to phase-out 
non-qualifying instruments up to 2023. 
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In fact, the Basel III regulation will be phased-in over a twelve-year period and be 
fully effective by 2023 by the phasing-out
16
 of non-qualifying instruments. A 
summary of the phase-in period is depicted as follows (Al-Darwish et al., 2011; 
Latham and Watkins, 2011; BCBS, 2011; BCBS, 2013a; BCBS, 2014; BCBS, 2015): 
 
 Increased tighter capital requirements: 
 
 Raising the minimum common equity capital ratio: 2013 –2014. 
 Newly introduced capital conservation buffer: 2016 –2018. 
 Application of countercyclical capital buffer: 2016 –2018. 
 Phase-in of deductions from core Tier 1 capital: 2014 –2017. 
 
 A tighter definition of qualifying capital instruments: phase-out of non-
qualifying instruments from 2013 to 2023. 
 
 The higher capital requirement for banking book exposures: commencing 
ended in 2010. 
 
 Increased capital requirements for trading book exposures: commencing 
ended in 2010. 
 
 Newly introduced leverage ratio: supervisory monitoring ended 2012, parallel 
run from 2013 – 2018; migration to Pillar 1 capital requirement in 2018; 
banks are required to disclose the leverage ratio from 1
st
 January 2015. 
 
 New liquidity ratios (BCBS, 2013a; BCBS, 2014): 
 
 Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR): observation period 2011 – 2014, 
commencement of new standard in 2015. 
 Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): observation period 2012 – 2017, 
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 Capital instruments that no longer qualify as Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital would be phased-out over  
a 10-year horizon starting from 2013. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
It is certainly true the Basel Accords are critically important for banks. The Accords, 
particularly Basel II, obviously has helped banks to identify, measure, and mitigate 
various risks (Cannata and Quagliariello, 2009; McAleer, et al., 2012). Risk 
management, in fact, gained momentum after the implementation of Basel II, albeit 
showing major flaws in some cases during the global financial crisis in 2007/08.  
 
Nevertheless, the new regulation (i.e. Basel III) has been reconfigured to capture all 
the relevant risks such as credit, market, operational, liquidity, concentration, 
strategic, residual, environmental, and securitisation risks to make the banking 
system more resilient by increasing enhanced capital and liquidity requirements. The 
newly introduced leverage ratio will contain a system-wide expansion of leverage 
and the new liquidity ratios (LCR and NSFR) are expected to reduce the systematic 
crises in the global economy which would provide macroeconomic benefits in the 
long-run. However, the actual impacts of the regulation may only be known after the 
completion of the phase-in period in 2018. Until then, regulators are required to rely 
on the impending effects of Basel III regulation to formulate further policies for 












Review of Literature 
 
 
The previous chapter (Chapter 2) described the evolution of the Basel Accords. In 
particular, the chapter delineated different norms of the Basel III regulation and 
presented a pictorial view of the comparisons of the Basel II and Basel III standards. 
Finally, a road map was depicted in the previous chapter to show the implementation 
phase of the Basel III norms. This chapter, however, synthesises the current literature 
on Basel III, relevant to this thesis. The literature has been organised on the 
objectives of the thesis and is structured as follows: Section 3.1 furnishes an 
introductory note on the Basel III literature. Literature related to the resilience of 
banks has been discussed in Section 3.2, whereas the literature on the impact of 
Basel III on lending rate/spread has been described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
depicts the previous empirical works of the costs and benefits of Basel III regulation, 
and finally, gaps in the existing literature are delineated in Section 3.5. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Policy-makers, economists, and practitioners singled out the capital structure 
requirement of Basel II as one of the major causes of bank failures in the most recent 
financial crisis. The capital maintained by banks as per the Basel II regulation was 
clearly insufficient to safeguard banks during the global financial crisis (Cannata and 
Quagliariello, 2009; Nowak, 2011). Thus, it was felt the global financial architecture 
needed to be strengthened, standardised and resilient to withstand the major shocks 
of any impending global crisis (Lall, 2009; BCBS, 2010b; IIF, 2011; IMF, 2010).  
 
In response to this criticism, the BCBS came up with a revised capital and liquidity 
regulation, called Basel III, to protect banks from adverse shocks during a major 
financial crisis. The Basel III regulation are expected to reduce systemic risks of 
banks and build resilient banking systems by increasing the quantity and quality of 
bank capital and liquidity standards (Reisen, 2008; Calice, 2010; Caggiano and 
Calice, 2011; Wellink, 2011). In effect, capital requirements improve financial 
28 
stability by decreasing banks‟ incentives to undertake excessive risks ex ante, and by 
making banks even more competent to absorb losses ex post. In the following 
sections, the existing literature relevant to the research objectives, e.g., the resilience 
of banks, the impact of Basel III on loan pricing, and the costs and benefits of  
Basel III have been discussed. 
 
3.2 Literature related to Resilience of Banks 
The relationship between capital strength and the resilience of the banking sector is 
complex as revealed by the global financial crisis. In order to analyse the risk taking 
behaviours of banks, Laeven and Levine (2008) have used a Z-score model to 
explore the solvency of banks (risk taking) due to regulatory capital requirements. 
The study defined the Z-score
17
 as a return on assets (ROA) plus the capital to asset 
ratio (CAR) divided by the standard deviation of return on assets [ (   ) . 
According to Laeven and Levine (2008), a higher Z-score confers the banks are more 
stable. The authors have estimated the Z-scores of 288 banks across 48 countries 
covering a sample period of 1999 to 2004. The study included bank level as well as 
country level variables such as capital to asset ratio, cash flow, revenue growth, size 
(total asset), loan loss provision, liquidity, per capita income and deposit insurance. 
The study suggests the banks' solvency increases by 0.3 standard deviations when the 
capital ratio is raised by one standard deviation. 
 
However, the Z-score model
18
 has been applied differently by Abdel-Baki (2012) to 
determine the association between the Basel III requirements and bank credit growth 
using data from the period 2004 to 2009 in 47 emerging market economies. In this 
study, the Z-score is explained as the "number of standard deviations by which bank 
credit growth would drop from the mean to accommodate the necessary 
restructuring of bank assets in order to comply with the Basel III requirements 
(capital, liquidity and leverage)" (Abdel-Baki, 2012, p. 10). Three types of 
independent variables have been employed in the study i.e. vector of Basel III 
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The formula for calculating Z-score as defined by Laeven and Levine (2008) is: 
             (   )                    (   )




 Abdel-Baki (2012) has defined Z-score as "{(average credit growth/GDP) + recapitalization + 
(liquidity enhancement/GDP)} divided by {standard deviation of (credit growth/GDP growth), i.e. σ 
(C/Y))" (p. 10). 
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compliance  (Tier 1 capital ratio, LCR, NSFR and leverage ratio); vector of country 
characteristics measured by inflation, exchange rate, employment growth and 
sovereign rating; and vector of bank characteristics measured by bank size (proxied 
by equity), loan-deposit ratio (LDR) and loan loss provisioning (LLP). The study 
reveals a high Z-score is associated with banks having the higher levels of capital, 
which suggest higher capital levels ensure the solvency of banks. However, Abdel-
Baki (2012) has recommended not imposing leverage ratios upon the nations of 
emerging market economies because when the leverage ratio is removed from the 
model, the robustness of the model improves. Hence, the resilience of banks does not 
deteriorate if emerging economies are exempted from the requirement of leverage 
ratio.  
 
Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012) have used distance-to-default as a measure of 
resilience. They have considered a panel sample of 94 banks over the period 2004 – 
2011. The study takes into account market beta of each bank, house prices, relative 
size, leverage, derivative exposure, trading assets, wholesale funding and Tier 1 
capital ratio. The findings of the study by Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012) 
suggest Tier 1 capital has no impact on the resilience of banks but leverage ratio 
provides strong support. 
 
Vallascas and Keasey (2012) have used the contingent claim approach (CCA) to 
assess the default risk of banks in the aftermath of financial crisis. The analysis has 
been carried out on a sample of 153 banks in 17 European countries covering the 
period 1992 – 2008. The study has incorporated  micro-prudential variables, such as 
total assets as a proxy for bank size, ratio of total asset to country GDP, non-interest 
income over operating income, ratio of primary liquidity to total asset, ratio of retail 
deposits to total debt, off-balance sheet items over total assets, ratio of asset to book 
value of equity as well as capital adequacy ratio (CAR).  Control variables such as, 
the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of bank asset concentration, real GDP growth rate and rate of inflation  
are also included in the analysis. Vallascas and Keasey (2012) have concluded the 
enforcement of liquidity requirements and placing an embargo on the banks' leverage 
ratio would improve the resilience of banks to systematic shocks. 
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Using a similar approach as Laeven and Levine (2008), Chalermchatvichien et al. 
(2014) have also investigated the risk taking attitudes of banks by employing  
the Z-score
19
 model. They have analysed data from 68 banks in 11 East Asian 
countries from the period 2005 to 2009. The countries sampled are Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, China, the Philippines, 
Japan, Sri Lanka, and India.  This study has used variables such as, ownership 
structure, NSFR, EBIT, loan loss provision, Tobin's Q (calculated by adding the 
"market value of equity with book value of liabilities divided by the book value of 
total assets", p. 41), deposits, GDP, per capita income, and dummy variables 
representing trend. The study has found an increase in capital strength by one 
standard deviation reduces the risk of banks (the resilience of banks increased 
through the improved Z-scores) by 5.37%. 
 
The empirical evidence related to the liquidity standards of Basel III provides 
important lessons to banks. In fact, regulators, policy makers, and banks are 
concerned about the varying degrees of impacts of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) on the solvency of banks. Few empirical works 
have shed light on this evidence to improve the knowledge in this arena. For 
instance, Angora and Roulet (2011) have used a logit model to test the financial 
distress of the U.S. and UK banks. The sample period of the study was 2005 to 2009 
and consisted of 781 banks. In order to assess the financial distress of banks, Angora 
and Roulet (2011) have used two Basel ratios; the NSFR and the capital adequacy 
ratio (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital divided by the total risk-weighted asset). The study 
has also included other variables such as the ratio of loan loss provision to total asset, 
the natural logarithm of the total asset as a proxy for the bank size, the annual GDP 
growth rate and management efficiency measured by the cost-income ratio in the 
logit model. Angora and Roulet (2011) have suggested the imposition of NSFR 
reduces the distress, consequently, improves the resilience of banks. 
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The same model of Laeven and Levine (2008) have used by Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) to 
calculate Z-score and is defined as "the return on assets (ROA) plus the capital-asset ratio divided by 
the standard deviation of asset returns" i.e., 
             (   )                    (   )
 (   )
   
(Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014, p. 34) 
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Employing data from 2005 to 2012 for 2079 banks in 128 countries of Africa, Asia-
Pacific, Europe, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Central Asia and Western 
Hemisphere, Gobat et al. (2014) has demonstrated the impact of the net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR) on banks' operations. They have used the latest (2014) 
methodology of the BCBS to calculate the NSFR and apply a sensitivity test to 
understand the impact of liquidity on the solvency of banks. The results of Gobat et 
al. (2014) have shown banks, which have fallen short in keeping the threshold level 
of NSFR are likely to weaken the resilient capability, which might in turn cause 
insolvency of banks.  
 
Applying data from about 11,000 banks in the US and UK from 2001 – 2009 and 
employing the probit model, Vazquez and Federico (2015) have investigated the 
liquidity structure (i.e., NSFR) in order to understand the implications for the 
financial stability of banks. The study has included the capital to asset ratio, net 
stable funding ratio (NSFR), asset growth, the share of trading revenue to total 
revenue, the proportion of off-balance sheet asset and a Z-score (solvency) as the 
explanatory variables in the model. The results of the study have shown a 19.2% 
increase in NSFR causes a 1.6% decline in the probability of bank failure (i.e., 
increase solvency). Similarly, a 4.6% increase in capital to asset ratio increases the 
banks' solvency by 0.8%.  
 
3.3 Literature on the Impact of Basel III on Lending Rate/Spread 
The significant role of capital and liquidity holdings of banks in line with the 
requirements of Basel III is evident. Empirical studies show the impact of a higher 
capital requirement, principally, increases the lending rate. The marginal cost of 
increasing equity is translated into a higher lending rate for which banks tend to 
reduce the volume of lending (BCBS, 2012). Hence, it is important to quantify these 
effects to determine the accurate size of an increase in the minimum capital levels. 
 
The debate surrounding the effects of increased capital on lending has been assessed 
by several studies. Elliott (2009), for instance, has estimated the effects of increased 
capital requirements on lending in the U.S. The study has postulated the interest rates 
on loans depend on the required rate of return on equity, cost of deposit, and 
administrative and other expenses. Elliott (2009) has contended if the equity level 
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increases by 4%, the lending rate goes up by 0.77%. However, his study strongly 
recommends the U.S. banking sector could offset the costs of higher capital 
requirements on loans through a number of strategies, such as reducing costs of 
deposits or decreasing costs of operations, and interestingly, he has suggested these 
adjustments would not cause a disaster in the banking system. 
 
 
The Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG)
20
 (2010a), however, has used 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE), Semi-structural and Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) models to measure the macroeconomic impact of Basel III. 
The MAG (2010a) has evaluated 97 models submitted by 17 member countries of 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The MAG (2010a) has shown the increased 
capital requirements increase the lending spread by 0.15% and reduce the lending 
volume by 1.4%. They have also shown a 25% increase in banks' liquidity increases 
the lending spread by 0.14% and decreases the lending volume by roughly 3.2%. 
This study has implied lending rates are likely to increase in the Basel III 
implementing countries, which in turn will reduce the lending volume in the 
economy. 
 
The BCBS (2010a) has examined how the lending spread and outputs are affected by 
the norms of Basel III. The sample size of the study consisted of 6660 banks 
covering the period 1993 to 2007 in 13 member countries of the BCBS. In order to 
measure the impact of additional capital requirements on lending rates, return on 
equity (ROE) and cost of deposits have been considered. The assessment of the 
BCBS (2010a) has revealed a 1% increase in the capital adequacy ratio increases the 
spread on loans by 0.13% and the additional costs of holding liquid assets increase 
the spread by 0.25%. The BCBS (2010a) has also pointed out the ROE of banks 
reduces with the increase in capital adequacy ratio and hence, in order to offset the 
higher costs of fund, banks would need to increase the spread on loans to keep ROE 
invariable. 
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“Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) was established by Financial Stability Board and Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision in 2010. The members of MAG consist of macroeconomic 
modelling experts from central banks and regulators in 15 countries and a number of international 
institutions. Stephen Cecchetti, Economic Adviser of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was the 
chair of the Group"  (Macro Economic Assessment Group (MAG), 2010b, p. 1) 
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In a similar vein, King (2010) has demonstrated the impact of additional capital and 
liquidity requirements on the lending spread by analysing data from the period 1993 
to 2007 in the US and Euro Zone. The study has scrutinised balance sheet and 
income statement identities along with the return on equity (ROE), the regulatory 
capital ratio defined as capital to RWA
21
, and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). 
The study has proposed in order to meet a 1% increase in capital, banks would need 
to increase the lending spread by around 0.15%. On the same token, banks are 
required to increase the spread by about 0.24% in order to maintain the NSFR 
requirement of Basel III. 
 
Using data from 1976 – 2008, Kashyap et al. (2010) have estimated a panel 
regression model to capture the impact of higher capital requirements on large banks 
in the US. The study has pointed out banks would gradually phase-in the higher 
capital requirements because raising new equity is more costly than the internally 
generated fund. The study concludes the lending rate would increase up to 0.45% for 
a 10% increase in the capital requirements.  
 
In order to understand the impact of tighter capital on the lending spread in African 
Countries, Caggiano and Calice (2011) have also employed a panel regression model 
covering the period from 2001 – 2008. The sample of the study consists of 1061 
African banks.  Caggiano and Calice (2011) have considered the capital to total asset 
ratio, return on equity (ROE) and real interest rate in the lending spread model. The 
study has found a 1% increase in capital ratio increases the lending spread by around 
0.84%.  
 
Employing the same model used as Elliott (2009), Santos and Elliott (2012) have 
concluded the average lending rate of banks is expected to rise by 0.28% in the 
United States, 0.17% in Europe and 0.08% in Japan in the long run due to the 
estimated increase in regulatory costs of Basel III. The study has again estimated the 
funding cost would increase by 2% in Europe, 1.25% in Japan, and 2% in the U.S for 
holding liquidity in accordance with the Basel III requirements.  
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 Capital ratios can be defined in two ways based on the banks‟ balance sheet; one is accounting 
capital and the other one is regulatory capital. Accounting capital ratio is the ratio of the total equity to 
risk-weighted asset whereas regulatory capital ratio is defined as regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) 
divided by risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
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Using a cointegration test on quarterly bank-level data from 1997:Q1 - 2010:Q2 from 
twelve UK banks, Yan et al. (2012) have assessed the effects of Basel III on lending 
rates. The study has explained for a 0.10% increase in capital, the lending spread 
increases by 0.50%. The effect is greater in the case of increased liquidity 
requirement of banks; a 1% increase in net stable funding ratio results in an increase 
of spread by 10%. 
 
Parcon-Santos and Bernabe (2012) have exploited the VAR model using data from  
2001 – 2008 to show the macroeconomic effects of Basel III in the Philippines. The 
study has suggested a 1% increase in capital ratio increases the lending spread by 
about 3.08%. 
 
Applying scenario analysis on the Modigliani and Miller (MM) proposition, 
Cummings and Wright (2015) have shown the evidence of the effects of higher 
capital requirements on the funding costs of banks in Australia. The study has 
suggested that for a 5% increase in the capital to asset ratio, the borrowing costs to 
bank customers (i.e. the lending rate of banks) would increase by 0.20%. Cummings 
and Wright (2015) have raised concerns that the magnitude of this increase in 
borrowing costs might have undesirable consequences on the economic activity in 
Australia.  
 
3.4 Literature on the Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of Basel III Regulation 
The capital position of banks is a key determinant of credit growth in an economy 
(BCBS, 2012). A higher capital requirement increases the strength of the credit 
delivery channel and healthier capitalised banks are capable of supplying further 
credit to the economy (Francis and Osborne, 2009), which eventually accelerates the 
GDP growth. Moreover, higher capital and liquidity requirements ensure financial 
stability in the economy by reducing the probability of a crisis (Osborne et al., 2010; 
Kato et al., 2010). Although the cost of additional capital is seen to increase the 
lending spread, the net benefits of holding a higher amount of capital are positive 
(Osborne et al., 2010; Caggiano and Calice, 2011). Similar studies on the 
macroeconomic impact of tighter capital regulation have been documented by Barrell 
et al. (2008; 2009), Bank of Canada (2010), the BCBS (2010a), the MAG (2010a; 
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2010b), Wong et al. (2010), Caggiano and Calice (2011), Elliott et al. (2012), 
Parcon-Santos and Bernabe (2012), and Yan et al. (2012). 
 
Using DSGE, Semi-structural and VAR models, the MAG (2010a) has assessed the 
impact of Basel III on the macroeconomic conditions of 17 member countries the 
BCBS. The results have shown for a 1% enhancement in capital ratio
22
, GDP drops 
from the baseline by about 0.19% in four and half years. This is synonymous to 
decline in the annual GDP growth rate by 0.04%. However, the MAG (2010a) did 
not assess the macroeconomic benefits associated with Basel III. 
 
Employing the same methodology utilized by the MAG (2010a), the BCBS (2010a) 
has estimated the macroeconomic costs and benefits of stronger capital and liquidity 
reforms. The analysis of the BCBS (2010a) has shown raising capital ratio by 1% 
renders a 0.09% decline in GDP relative to baseline. On the other hand, a 1% 
increase in capital ratio decreases the likelihood of a financial crisis from 4.6% to 3% 
and a gain in GDP of around 0.96%. Therefore, the net benefit of higher capital is 
about a 0.87% increase in GDP. 
 
Angelini et al. (2011) have conducted a study on the assessment of the long-term 
economic costs of tighter capital and liquidity standards in terms of economic 
performance and fluctuations. Using the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model, semi-structured and vector error correction models (VECM), 
Angelini et al. (2011) have evaluated 13 models submitted by the BCBS member 
countries; Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
United States. Essentially, Angelini et al. (2011) have suggested a 1% increase in 
capital to asset ratio from 7% to 8%, the economy contracts by about 0.09% and for a 
25% increase in liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDP reduces by 0.08%. Moreover, 
for a 1% increase in the capital to asset ratio, the improvement of the standard 
deviation (fluctuation) of GDP is about 1%. Hence, the economic performance 
improves due to an increase in the capital ratio. 
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The MAG (2010a) has used tangible common equity (TCE) to total risk-weighted asset ratio in the 
model. 
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Addressing the Italian economy, Locarno (2011) has presented evidence of 
regulatory impacts by assessing the costs associated with transforming to Basel III. 
Using the Bank of Italy Quarterly Model (BIQM) - a semi-structural large-scale 
macroeconomic model covering data from 2011:Q1 – 2022:Q4, the study states for a 
1% increase in the tangible common equity (TCE) ratio, the level of GDP declines up 
to 0.33%, which is equivalent to the reduction in annual growth rate of GDP of about 
0.04%.  
 
Using cointegration and the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) covering 
quarterly data over the period from 1994:Q1 – 2008:Q3 in the U.S., Gambacorta 
(2011) has examined the impact of Basel III on macroeconomic activity. The author 
has considered the long run relationships amongst the real GDP, short-term real 
interest rate, spread, loan portfolio, ROE, liquidity to deposit ratio, Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted asset ratio (TRA), tightening indicator, and government spending. The 
study concludes the tighter capital and liquidity ratios negatively affect the long run 
steady-state output and seriously affect the profitability of banks; a 1% increase in 
capital ratio causes around a 0.1% drop in output (GDP) relative to the baseline. 
Gambacorta (2011), however, did not estimate the benefits of Basel III regulation. 
 
Caggiano and Calice (2011) have used panel data from 22 African countries over the 
period 2001 to 2008 to explore the impact of higher capital on output through the 
lending channel. By estimating the impact of lending spread on GDP, Caggiano and 
Calice (2011) have suggested enhancing capital to asset ratio by 2%, the loss in GDP 
would increase by around 0.12%. However, a 2% higher capital ratio would increase 
the gain in GDP by about 0.16%. Hence, the net benefits would increase by roughly 
0.05%. The study has measured the crisis probability using a multi-variate logit 
model and has asserted a 1% increase in capital ratio would reduce the likelihood of 
a crisis by 0.5%, and this is associated with an increase in output (GDP) of around 
0.165%.   
 
Yan et al. (2012) have used Johansen trace statistics (cointegration test) and the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to analyse twelve banks' quarterly data from 
1997:Q1 to 2010:Q2 to measure the long run costs and benefits of Basel III in the 
UK. The study has examined the long-term cointegrating relationships amongst the 
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real GDP, real bank lending, short-term interest rate (measured by deducting 
inflation from 3-month interbank rate), lending spread, return on equity (ROE),  
Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted asset ratio (TRA), and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). 
The study has revealed a 1% increase in capital requirement increases the associated 
costs in terms of decline in GDP by 0.08%. However, by raising the same level of 
capital, the likelihood of crises would be reduced by 1.4% and the associated gain in 
GDP would increase by 0.49%. Thus, for a 1% increase in capital ratio, the net 
benefits in terms of gain in output (GDP) would increase by 0.41%. 
 
Similarly, Parcon-Santos and Bernabe (2012) have demonstrated the macroeconomic 
impact of Basel III by estimating the costs and benefits in the Philippines. The 
sample of the study comprised 33 banks covering data from 2006 – 2011. In order to 
estimate the costs, they have used unrestricted VAR models. Using the tangible 
common equity (TCE), lending spread, loan portfolio, and real GDP as the 
endogenous variables, the study suggests for a 1% increase in capital level, GDP 
would decline (costs of Basel III) by about 0.01% and with the same level of increase 
in capital (i.e. 1%) would produce an annual benefit of 0.02% of GDP. Hence, the 
net benefits of implementing Basel III in the Philippines have been 0.01% of steady-
state output, which is positive. 
 
Roger and Vitek (2012) have performed a study employing structural 
macroeconomic panel model with a Bayesian procedure involving 15 major 
advanced and emerging markets (Canada, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, 
China, Australia, Korea and Japan). The results of the study suggest a 1% increase in 
the capital requirement of Global Systematically Important Banks (GSIB) would 
adversely affect GDP by around 0.17%. 
 
Bernabe and Jaffar (2013) have investigated the macroeconomic impact of Basel III 
using panel data from banks in Malaysia. The study has applied a panel least square 
estimator to measure the benefits of Basel III regulation. The 'Benefit Model' 
includes banks' income capacity (net income, return on equity (ROE) and return on 
assets (ROA)), risk indicators of banks‟ balance sheet (risk weighted assets, net loans, 
loan write offs), and structural indicators representing size (total assets) and capital 
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as the explanatory variables. In order to estimate the costs of Basel III, Bernabe and 
Jaffar (2013) have used the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model by including the 
bank capital, lending wedge, total bank loan, and real GDP in the model. The 
estimates have suggested a 1% increase in capital yields savings of 0.76% in GDP 
due to a reduction in the probability of a crisis occurring. However, for a 1% increase 
in capital, GDP declines by roughly 0.46%. This means the tighter capital regulation 
produces a net increase (benefit) in GDP of about 0.30%. 
 
Recently, Noss and Toffano (2016) have estimated the impact of enhancing bank 
capital on lending and growth. Using data from 1986 to 2010 from banks in the UK, 
Noss and Toffano (2016) have applied VAR models with sign restrictions. They have 
concluded a 1% increase in the capital requirement is associated with a 4.5% 
reduction in lending and a 0.85% decline in GDP growth. 
 
3.5 Gaps in Existing Literature 
Gaps in the existing literature have been organised according to the objectives of the 
thesis: 
 
3.5.1 Relevance of Basel III Regulation to Increase Solvency of Banks 
Existing literature seems to rely on the Z-score model to analyse the robustness of 
banks' stability (solvency) (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Abdel-Baki, 2012; 
Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014). The study conducted by Chalermchatvichien et al. 
(2014) have examined whether the solvency (risk taking) of banks increased or not 
(higher Z-score) by including only the NSFR. Abdel-Baki (2012) has included Tier 1 
capital ratio, liquidity ratio and leverage ratio in the model. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult from the study by Abdel-Baki to identify the individual effects of LCR and 
NSFR because he combines both the ratios and has referred to it as a liquidity ratio. 
Hence, none of the present studies have included all three Basel III requirements - 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) in the same model (Z-score model) to determine the impact on the 
solvency of banks. The existing literature uses the capital to asset ratio as a proxy for 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) in order to calculate the Z-score, which is neither risk-
based nor a regulatory ratio of Basel III. However, no studies so far have shown the 
impact of CAR, Tier 1 capital ratio, and leverage ratio in the same study. 
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Studies testing the solvency of the BRICS banks appear to be scarce. Hence, such a 
study seems timely given that the BRICS economies represent one-fifth of the total 
world GDP and have an autonomous multilateral bank established (IMF, 2013; 
Schuman, 2014; Venu, 2014). The present thesis examines the stability of 
commercial banks in the BRICS economies by incorporating the LCR and NSFR in a 
model together with CAR, Tier 1 ratio, and leverage ratio. Hence, the research 
question to be addressed is: 
 
Research Question 1: How does Basel III ensure the resilience (solvency) of banks in 
the BRICS economies? 
 
3.5.2 Impact of Basel III on Loan Price of Banks 
The Basel III requires banks to maintain a higher amount of capital. Keeping each 
unit of additional capital and liquidity, the opportunity cost of holding such capital 
increases (Osborne et al., 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). It is 
assumed those costs may be passed on to borrowers in terms of increased lending 
rates (BCBS, 2012). Therefore, it is imperative to investigate the impact of Basel III 
on the loan pricing of banks. The existing literature shows the loan price is a function 
of the cost of fund, cost operation, and the cost of capital (Elliott 2009; Slovik and 
Cournède, 2011; Santos and Elliott, 2012). These studies, however, have not 
individually incorporated the cost of equity, capital adequacy ratio, and NSFR in the 
same model to better understand the impact of those factors on the loan price 
(interest rate on loans).  
 
Another study by Caggiano and Calice (2011) has used the capital to asset ratio, 
return on equity (ROE) and real interest rate as the determinants of the lending 
spread. However, Caggiano and Calice (2011) have excluded the „costs of operation‟ 
and „costs of fund‟ from the model. This exclusion may not provide an accurate 
result to determine the lending rates as it violates the basic loan pricing equation.  
 
Since studies investigating the impact of Basel III on the loan price have neither 
included all the variables mentioned in the same model nor considered the BRICS 
economies, this study is novel in that it calibrates all the variables in the loan-pricing 
model. Therefore, the loan price of the BRICS banks should be a function of funding 
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cost, operating cost, the cost of capital proxied by return on equity (ROE), Tier 1 
capital ratio (TRA), and NSFR. To this end, the following research question will be 
answered: 
 
Research Question 2: Does the lending rate of banks increase due to Basel III 
compliance? 
 
3.5.3 Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of Basel III 
Basel III requires banks to increase their capital in order to protect banks from any 
unexpected economic shocks (BCBS, 2010a). Any financial regulation has costs as 
well as benefits. If the benefits outweigh the costs of regulation, there are merits in 
adopting it. The benefits of higher capital are generated mainly through reducing 
systemic risks, which would reduce the severity and frequency of financial crises 
(Barrell et al., 2009; Kato et al., 2010) and would save any accompanying loss to 
GDP (BCBS, 2012). On the other hand, holding additional capital is costly, which 
banks load in the loan prices by raising the interest rate on loans (BCBS, 2012). This 
slows down the activities of borrowers resulting in a lower GDP growth.  
 
Some studies have explored the costs and benefits associated with Basel III 
regulation such as Schanz (2009), Barrell et al. (2009), BCBS (2010a; 2010b; 2012), 
MAG (2010a), Kato et al. (2010), Caggiano and Calice (2011), Gambacorta (2011), 
Schanz et al. (2011), and Yan et al. (2012). However, no such studies have used the 
calibrated model of loan price as stated above i.e. the cost of fund, administrative 
cost, the cost of capital, return on equity (ROE), Tier 1 capital ratio (TRA), and NSFR 
in the same equation to determine the costs of holding higher capital. 
 
The existing literature examines the costs and benefits of Basel III in the context of 
the US, the UK, Europe, Africa and some Asian countries. Since the BRICS have 
emerged as very important economies (IMF, 2013; Foroohar, 2009), the impact 
assessment of Basel III is fundamental to the macroeconomic performance of the 
BRICS. However, there has been no such study, which has estimated the costs and 
benefits of Basel III in the context of the BRICS. Therefore, this thesis would fill this 
research gap and determine the costs and benefits of Basel III in the context of the 
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BRICS markets, and in order to deal with this problem (gap), the following research 
questions will be addressed. 
 
Research Question 3: Will the Basel III regulation increase the macroeconomic costs 
in the BRICS economies? 
 
Research Questions 4: Will the Basel III regulation bring significant economic 
benefits to the BRICS economies?  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
From the previous literature, it can be concluded that the banks' resilience increases 
by implementing Basel III norms. This regulation is also critical in increasing the 
lending rate of banks. However, banks shift those costs to borrowers by increasing 
the interest rates on loans. As such, credit flows in the economy contract resulting in 
lower levels of investment and consumption. Therefore, the economy suffers in the 
short-run, but as banks become more resilient to withstand systematic shocks due to 
increasing capital levels, the probability of crises occurring in the economy declines. 
This, in turn, prevents loss of GDP. Thus, the economy will be benefited by 
implementing the Basel III standards. In fact, the net benefits of implementing the 
Basel III norms are positive in most economies as indicated by past studies.  
Figure-3.1 gives a clearer picture of the effects of Basel III on economic growth as 



















Figure 3.1: Effects of Basel III Requirements on Economic Growth 
 
 
Source: Based on Martynova (2015) and various literatures  
 
 
Similarly, a literature review carried out by BCBS (2016) also shows how the 
regulatory requirements of Basel III are transmitted to economic activity. In their 
literature review, the BCBS (2016) exhibits individual bank reactions along with the 
overall macroeconomic impacts of higher capital and liquidity requirements. The 












Figure 3.2: Transmission Mechanism of Basel III Requirements to Economic 
Activity 
 
Source: BCBS (2016) 
 
However, the existing literature seems to rely on the Z-score model to explore how 
capital requirement increases the resilience of banks. In order to quantify the lending 
rates due to increased capital requirements, the present literature has utilised the 
loan-pricing model and some authors have employed the panel regression models to 
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investigate the impact of loan price on GDP (cost of Basel III). Finally, the existing 
empirical studies have applied the quantitative impact assessment methodology, as 
suggested by the BCBS, to assess the benefits of Basel III. In the current literature, 
however, the following shortcomings are identified: 
 
 The application of all the Basel III norms in a single study is missing; 
 
 In order to calculate the Z-score, previous studies use capital to asset 
ratio (CAR) which is neither a regulatory ratio nor risk-based. Hence, 
studies incorporating the Z-scores by considering risk-based ratio 
such as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) (i.e. regulatory ratio of  
Basel III) have yet to be done; 
 
 Inclusion of the liquidity ratios (e.g., NSFR, LCR) in modelling the 
lending rates is still a new avenue for research; 
 
 In estimating the costs of Basel III, previous studies have not used a 
comprehensive model of loan price incorporating the cost of fund, 
administrative costs, the cost of capital, the return on equity (ROE), 
Tier 1 capital ratio (TRA), and NSFR in the same model; 
 













Data and Research Methodology 
 
This chapter has been organised into several parts. Section 4.1 gives an overview of 
the methodology employed. Section 4.2 provides the data sources and the definition 
of the variables used in the thesis. The sampling technique and sampling period are 
described in Section 4.3 and 4.4, respectively whereas the data analysis techniques 
are portrayed in Section 4.5. The econometric models employed to test the 
hypotheses are outlined in Section 4.6. Finally, the concluding remarks are provided 
in Section 4.7. 
 
4.1 An Overview of the Estimation 
The objectives of this thesis are to assess the impact of Basel III on the solvency of 
banks and to measure the macroeconomic costs and benefits in terms of GDP. In 
order to achieve this goal, first, a Z-score model is employed to test the resilience of 
banks due to an increase in capital requirements using a panel regression model. 
Next, the impact of higher capital and liquidity requirements on the lending rate of 
banks is assessed. Previous literature suggests lending rate increases due to 
additional capital requirements and the resulting effects are a lower credit flow in the 
economy, which penalises the output (GDP) by contracting economic activity. These 
effects are examined by applying a panel regression model where the dependent 
variable is the GDP and the independent variables are the loan price of banks and the 
real interest rate in the economy. The benefits of higher capital are assessed by 
following the models of BCBS (2010a) where the reduction of probability of a crisis 
is multiplied by the savings in GDP. Finally, the net benefits have been calculated by 
subtracting the costs from the benefits. 
 
In order to estimate the panel regression models, bank-level variables such as capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital ratio (TRA), leverage ratio (LEV), loan-deposit 
ratio (LDR), the cost of fund (COF), the cost of operation (COO), liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR), net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and loan price (LP) have been used.  
46 
In addition, with the purpose of assessing the effects of regulatory reforms on the 
systematic soundness of banks in an economy, a set of country characteristics such as 
GDP, real interest rate, exchange rate, inflation, real house price growth, the ratio of 
current account balance to nominal GDP is included in the panel regression model. 
This is due to the fact that regulators are not only concerned about the risks of 
individual banks but they are also concerned about the overall systematic risk to the 
economy (Abdel-Baki, 2012). In fact, many central banks use exchange rate or 
interest rate as a policy instrument to regulate banks, which affects the banks‟ 
resilience and the overall macroeconomic situations of a country.  
 
4.2. Data Sources 
The thesis considers secondary sources of information in order to analyse the impact 
of Basel III on the BRICS economies. In this respect, annual reports of banks, 
websites, and research articles were utilised for preparing the report. More 
specifically, bank-level data have been collected from the annual reports of banks 
whereas the macroeconomic data have been extracted from the Datastream  a 
commercial source of macroeconomic data. 
 
4.2.1 Variable Definition 
The variables used in this thesis are described in the following sections. The details 
of the measurements (variables) used in the existing literature are depicted in  
Appendix 4.1.  
 
4.2.1.1 Z-Score 
Previous literature have employed the Z-score differently, for example, Laeven and 
Levine (2008) and Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) have used a Z-score to measure 
the solvency of banks where the studies have defined the Z-score as a return on 
assets (ROA) plus capital to asset ratio (TCA) divided by the standard deviation of 
return on assets. On the other hand, Abdel-Baki (2012) has described the Z-score as 
the average credit growth/GDP plus recapitalization plus liquidity enhancement/GDP 
divided by the standard deviation of credit growth/GDP growth. However, in this 
thesis, the Z-score has been defined as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) as defined in 
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Basel III plus return on assets (ROA) divided by the standard deviation of return on 
assets [(ROA)]. That is, 
 
       
(   )
                                                                                                               (   ) 
 
The standard deviation of ROA is calculated over the sample period of this thesis. 
Finally, as the Z-score series is highly skewed, the natural logarithm of the Z-score is 
taken and for brevity, the level “Z-score” is used throughout the thesis in order to 
measure and indicate the solvency of banks. 
 
4.2.1.2 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
According to the Basel III regulation, capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is defined as the 
regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) divided by the total risk-weighted asset. Using 
the same definition, banks report those figures in their annual reports. Hence, the 
data of CAR have been extracted from the annual reports of banks. 
 
4.2.1.3 Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
The Tier 1 capital comprises tangible common equity (CET) plus additional Tier 1 
(AT1) capital. The ratio is derived by dividing the Tier 1 capital by the total risk-
weighted assets. In Basel III, the minimum requirement of Tier 1 capital is set at 6%, 
which was 4% in the previous regulation (i.e. in Basel II). The BCBS believes an 
increase in the Tier 1 capital would increase the solvency of banks. This will also 
cause to increase the costs of capital of banks, as owners of the additional 
shareholders should be rewarded by giving additional returns. Thus, apart from the 
CAR, this thesis also considers the Tier 1 capital in order to assess the impact of 
additional capital requirements on the solvency as well as on the loan pricing of 
banks. 
 
4.2.1.4 Total Capital to Asset Ratio (TCA) 
This ratio considers leverage factors of banks. It is assumed the deleveraging would 
bring down the probability of crises. Hence, in line with the BCBS (2010a), this ratio 
is used to measure the probability of a crisis. 
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4.2.1.5 Leverage Ratio 
The leverage ratio is defined as total equity divided by total assets (BCBS, 2011). 
Previous literature has suggested global banks are exposed to the risk of insolvency 
and become highly vulnerable because of raising excessive leverage on their balance 
sheet (Vazquez and Federico, 2015). The BCBS (2011) has proposed to deleverage 
banks by offering a minimum leverage ratio of 3%. Therefore, banks would be more 
capitalised and the risk of insolvency would decline.  
 
4.2.1.6 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
The LCR is a new requirement for banks as proposed by the BCBS (2011). Liquidity 
coverage ratio is defined as the stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) divided by 
the net cash outflow over the next 30 calendar days. However, due to unavailability 
of required information, year-end values of financial statements are used to measure 
this ratio. Consequently, this thesis places less emphasis on the LCR. In effect, in a 
monthly horizon, the impact of LCR on the solvency of banks might not be visible 
(Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014). 
 
4.2.1.7 Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
NSFR is the ratio of available funding to required amount of funding and is 
calculated in a one-year horizon. It is a long-term liquidity requirement for banks. 
The aim of NSFR is to limit reliance on short-term funding sources. In order to 
calculate the NSFR, this thesis relies on the annual reports of banks. Hence, in some 
cases, the required granular data is missing, so the NSFR might differ from the actual 
ratio as calculated by a bank. However, the difference should be marginal (Gobat et 
al., 2014). Empirical evidence shows the NSFR significantly increases the solvency 
of banks (Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014; Vazquez and Federico, 2015). 
Furthermore, the BCBS (2010a) has suggested higher liquidity would likely increase 
the funding costs of banks. Therefore, in order to assess the impact of liquidity on the 
solvency and on the loan pricing of the BRICS banks, this thesis relies primarily on 
the NSFR, as defined in Basel III, as a measure of liquidity. The detailed calculation 




4.2.1.8 Total Asset  
Total assets represent the health of a bank. Hence, it is used as a proxy for the banks' 
size (Cleary and Hebb, 2016). Since the series is relatively skewed, the natural 
logarithms of the total assets are taken in this thesis to make the series normally 
distributed. It is assumed the larger banks are well capitalised, which reduces the risk 
of insolvency. Moreover, when assets are substantial, banks can diversify the assets 
in order to minimize risk exposure (Büyüksalvarcı and Abdioğlu, 2011). 
 
4.2.1.9 Loan-Deposit Ratio (LDR) 
The loan-deposit ratio is the ratio of total loans to deposits. This ratio indicates 
liquidity of banks. A low ratio implies investable funds on hand whereas a high ratio 
signifies excessive investments, and hence, are more prone to risks (Brown and 
Serder, 2011; Almanidis and Sickles, 2012). This measure is expected to exert a 
negative relationship with the overall financial health of banks (Cleary and Hebb, 
2016). However, this ratio also implies the quality of assets of banks (Abdel-Baki, 
2012). If banks intend to maintain a higher quality of loans, they would disburse 
selective loans resulting in a lower loan-deposit ratio making a bank more stable. 
 
4.2.1.10 Loan Price  
This is the major earning source for banks. Banks usually load the cost of fund, the 
cost of operation, and the cost of capital into the lending rate. In line with the works 
of Elliott (2009), the BCBS (2010a), the MAG (2010a), and Slovik and Cournède 
(2011), loan price in this thesis, represents the average lending rate of various loans 
of banks. 
 
4.2.1.11 Cost of Fund 
The cost of the fund represents the cost of deposit and borrowing of banks (Elliot, 
2009). If the cost of fund increases, banks increase the lending rate in order to 
recover the extra costs. Hence, there would be a positive association between the cost 
of fund and the lending rate of banks. This thesis considers the average cost of fund 





4.2.1.12 Cost of Operation  
The cost of operation is the administrative costs of banks (Elliott, 2009). Like the 
cost of fund, banks increase the lending rate when the cost of operations increases  
(BCBS, 2010a; Santos and Elliott, 2012). The share of operating cost to total loans 
and advances has been used in this thesis to represent the cost of operation. It is 
expected the cost of operation would be positively correlated with the lending rate of 
banks. 
 
4.2.1.13 Return on Equity  
Return on equity is a proxy for the profitability of banks. The return on equity is 
derived by dividing the net profits by shareholders' equity. If banks earn a higher 
profit, return on equity would be higher and shareholders would expect a higher 
return on their capital. Thus, it represents the cost of capital from the bank's point of 
view. However, if banks‟ returns decline, they may cut dividend payments resulting 
in a lower return on capital of shareholders. Hence, the return on equity and the 
lending rate are expected to have a positive relationship. 
 
4.2.1.14 Real Exchange Rate  
Exchange rates, in many economies, are used as excessive regulatory controls 
(Abdel-Baki, 2012). Hence, exchange rates are used as an explanatory variable to 
understand their impact on the solvency of banks. Real exchange rate, in this thesis, 
represents the nominal rate adjusted for inflation. Like in Abdel-Baki (2012), the real 
exchange rate is taken against the USD and the direct quotation is used to express the 
BRICS banks' asset and liabilities in terms of US dollars. If domestic currency 
depreciates, the value of assets and liabilities would fall when expressed in US 
dollars. Hence, the exchange rate would exert a negative association with the 
solvency of banks. 
 
4.2.1.15 Inflation 
Inflation indicates the average price level of an economy (Abdel-Baki, 2012; Hermes 
and Meesters, 2015). It affects the economic value of resources (i.e. costs and 
revenues). A higher inflation confers that an economy is operating above its potential 
growth level and it is easier for firms to reset higher prices in order to earn additional 
profits. Consequently, a higher level of inflationary spiral helps the borrowing firms 
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to repay their debts with the additional income. Thus, inflation is expected to have a 
positive association with the solvency of banks. A number of studies, such as, Shu 
(2002), Boss (2002), Hoggarth et al. (2005), Baboucek and Jancar (2005), 
Athanasoglou et al. (2006), Tracey (2007), Akhter and Daly (2009), Roy and 
Bhattacharya (2011) and Abdel-Baki (2012) have found a strong positive impact of 
inflation on banks‟ soundness. 
 
4.2.1.16 Real GDP 
In order to assess the costs and benefits of Basel III, the real GDP is considered 
(BCBS, 2010a; King, 2010; Leaven and Valencia, 2008; 2010; MAG, 2010a; 2010b; 
Yan et al., 2012). The data on GDP are taken from the Datastream - a commercial 
source for country level data. The natural logarithm of the GDP series is used in 
order to measure the impact of the lending rate due to the increased capital 
requirements on GDP.  
 
4.2.1.17 Real Interest Rate 
Like the exchange rate, the interest rate is also a policy instrument in many countries 
(Abdel-Baki, 2012). There is a positive association between the real interest rate and 
the probability of a banking crisis (Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014). GDP is 
penalised with an increase in the real interest rate because of increasing the 
likelihood of crises. Hence, the real interest rate is entered in the cost assessment 
regression model. However, the real interest rate is proxied by the overall lending 
rate in economy (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1997) and the rate is obtained after 
adjustment for inflation (CPI). The data on the real interest rate are also extracted 
from the Datastream. 
 
4.2.1.18 Real House Price Growth 
The BCBS (2010a) has suggested the real house price growth is a critical 
determinant of a crisis. The likelihood of a crisis increases with the increase in the 
real house price growth (BCBS, 2010a; MAG, 2010a; 2010b). Hence, in order to 
measure the probability of a crisis, the data on the real house price growth are 
collected from the Datastream. 
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4.2.1.19 Current Account Balance to GDP  
Like in BCBS (2010a), the ratio of current account balance to GDP has been used to 
determine the probability of a crisis, whose data are also taken from the Datastream. 
It is expected a higher current account balance would reduce the likelihood of a 
crisis. 
 
4.2.1.20 Liquid Asset Ratio (LAR) 
Liquid asset ratio is the ratio of the cash and balances with the central bank plus 
securities over total assets. When liquid assets increase, banks become more solvent. 
Hence, banking panics declines resulting in lower chances of a crisis in the economy 
(BCBS, 2010a). 
 
4.3 Sampling Technique 
This thesis uses purposive sampling in order to ensure the availability and quality of 
the data. For this purpose, 50 locally incorporated commercial banks were selected 
from the BRICS based on the health of the balance sheet (assets size) because not all 
the banks have an extensive range of activities/operations. Due to the lack of 
required data such as regulatory ratios and other balance sheet information, at least 6 
banks from each country were included in the sample (the sampling distribution of 
the study by Vallascas and Keasey, (2012) comprises 153 banks where they have 
considered only 1 bank from Luxembourg, 2 banks from Austria, 3 banks from the 
Netherlands and so on and Abdel-Baki, (2012) have considered a minimum of 5 
banks from a country in the sample of his study). To this end, in order to make the 
panel balanced, the banks with inconsistent and missing data were removed from the 
sample, and finally, 43 banks (at least 6 banks from each country) were selected as 
the sample size of the thesis. 
 
4.4 Sampling Period 
In order to measure the impact of Basel III on the BRICS economies, secondary data 
have been used from 2007 to 2014. The motivation for choosing this time-span is all 
of the countries in the BRICS except Russia, have implemented Basel II from 2007 
(Kruger, 2004; Leeladhar, 2006; BCBS, 2013b). Like in King (2010), Gambacorta 
(2011), Yan et al. (2012) and Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014), this thesis uses the 
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capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and Tier 1 capital to risk weighted asset ratio, based on 
the definitions under Basel II as a proxy for the Basel III regulatory ratio. In fact, the 
principles of Basel III are based on the Basel II regulation (BCBS, 2011).  
 
4.5 Data Analysis Technique 
In order to analyse the data, a panel regression model has been employed
23
 (see 
Büyüksalvarcı and Abdioğlu, 2011; Chou and Lin, 2011; Chalermchatvichien et al., 
2014). In effect, the empirical testing of this thesis starts with estimating a pooled 
regression. After that, the random effect model is estimated to check whether the 
cross-section exerts a common intercept or not. For this purpose, Breusch-Pagan 
Langrange multiplier test has been applied to compare the suitability of the two 
models between pooled OLS and random effect model. In effect, if the p-value of the 
Breusch-Pagan Langrange multiplier test becomes significant, random effect model 
would be considered appropriate. Finally, this thesis estimates the fixed effect model, 
which is compared with the random effect model. Because, in a panel study, it is 
assumed fixed effects model can better handle the time-invariant factors, which is 
captured in the common intercept term in a panel estimate. Thus, a Hausman test has 
been applied to determine the better model between the random effects and fixed 
effects models. Apart from this, different statistical and econometric techniques have 
also been used to interpret the data.  
 
The implementation process of Basel III has been started from 2013, and 
accordingly, banks are expected to fully implement all the norms of Basel III after 
2018. Hence, this study is intended to explore the probable impacts of the new 
regulations on the BRICS economies by augmenting the existing requirements of 
Basel II with the new rules of Basel III. A similar methodology has been employed 
by the BCBS (2010c) in the quantitative impact assessment and by Sy (2011) to 
explore the macroeconomic impact of Basel III, where the Basel III capital ratio has 
been estimated by applying the new proposals to the present capital ratio under the 
current regulatory framework.  
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 With a sample size of 37 banks and covering the period from 2001- 2006, Chou and Lin (2011) 
have estimated a panel regression model with random effects. Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) also 
has used a static panel regression model on the data of 68 banks covering the period 2005 – 2009. 
Following the studies by Chou and Lin (2011) and Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014), this thesis also 
employs a static panel regression model and in order to decide between fixed effects and random 
effects models, a Hausman test is undertaken. 
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4.6 Econometric Models and Hypotheses Development 
In this section, according to the research questions, hypotheses have been developed. 
After which, the econometric models employed are described in order to test the 
hypotheses. 
 
4.6.1 Relevance of Basel III to Increase the Solvency of Banks 
The Basel III claims the implementation of the new standards will increase banks 
solvency. This suggests a similar observation of increased solvency would be 
witnessed if the standards were implemented regardless of the characteristics of the 
country. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
H0: Basel III will not ensure the resilience (solvency) of banks in the BRICS 
economies 
 
In line with the works of Laeven and Levine (2008), Abdel-Baki (2012), and 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014), where the Z-score was built to test the resilience 
(solvency) of banks due to increased capital and liquidity requirements, equation 
(4.2) is estimated to examine the resilience of banks. 
 
                                                                                  (   ) 
 
where, 
Z (Z-score) = return on assets (ROA) plus capital adequacy ratio (CAR) divided by 
the standard deviation of the return on assets, (ROA) (Laeven and Levine, 2008; 
Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014; Lou et al., 2016). 
 
BAS = Basel III requirements (capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital ratio 
(TRA), leverage ratio (LEV), liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), and net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR));  
 
BNK = bank characteristics (bank size proxied by the logarithm of total assets, and 
loan-deposit ratio); and  
CNT = country characteristics (logarithm of real exchange rate and inflation). 
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The Z-score implies the distance from insolvency (Laeven and Levine, 2008); the 
higher the calculated Z-score, the more stable (solvent) is a bank (Roy, 1952; Laeven 
and Levine, 2008; Abdel-Baki, 2012; Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014). 
 
4.6.2 Impact of Basel III Compliance on Loan Pricing of BRICS Banks 
The Basel III compliant banks are required to keep a higher amount of capital and 
hold an increased amount of liquidity, which increases the opportunity cost of 
investable funds of banks (Osborne et al., 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 
2011). This extra cost is likely to pass on to borrowers in the form of increased loan 
prices (BCBS, 2012). So, the hypothesis is stated as: 
 
H0: Lending rate will not be increased due to the Basel III compliance by the 
banks in the BRICS economies 
 
To measure the impact of Basel III on the lending rate based on models provided by 
Caggiano and Calice (2011) and Santos and Elliott (2012), the following panel 
regression model (4.3) is estimated. 
 
                                                                      (   ) 
 
where,  
LP = loan price (lending rate); 
TRA = Tier 1 capital to risk weighted asset ratio; 
NSFR = net stable funding ratio; 
COF = cost of fund; 
COO = cost of operation; and 
ROE = return on equity. 
 
4.6.3 Macroeconomic Costs of Tighter Capital Regulation 
Additional capital requirements increase the interest rate on loans. The resultant 
effect of a higher interest rate is reduced borrowing, and lower consumption and 
investment activity in the economy (Caggiano and Calice, 2011), which in turn 
affects output (GDP) (BCBS, 2012). Hence, the hypothesis related to 
macroeconomic costs can be formulated as: 
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H0: There is no macroeconomic costs associated with adopting Basel III in the 
BRICS economies 
 
Therefore, the costs of Basel III regulation is measured by estimating the impact on 
GDP (Caggiano and Calice, 2011), using equation (4.4). 
 
                                                                                                      (   ) 
 
where,  
Y = Logarithm of GDP; 
LP = loan price (lending rate); and  
RIR = real interest rate.  
It is expected that the lending rate will have a negative sign. 
 
4.6.4 Macroeconomic Benefits of Tighter Capital Regulation 
Increased capital requirements make banks more solvent. Thus, stronger capital base 
reduces the probability of a banking crisis (Barrell et al., 2009; Kato et al., 2010; 
MAG, 2010a) and protects loss of GDP. Hence, the hypothesis is presented as 
follows: 
 
H0: There are no economic benefits associated with adopting Basel III in the 
BRICS economies 
 
Empirical studies have postulated the impact assessment of a financial crisis is 
approximated by calculating the cumulative output (GDP) loss subsequent to a crisis 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008; 2010; Cecchetti et al., 2009; Caggiano and Calice, 
2011). Hence, the macroeconomic benefits connected with varying levels of capital 
may be achieved by multiplying "reduction in the probability of crisis" and "crisis 
output loss" (Caggiano and Calice, 2011; Yan et al., 2012). In other words, the 
reduction of the probability of a crisis would save GDP loss. Thus, the benefits 
would be measured following the models of Laeven and Valencia (2008; 2010), 
Caggiano and Calice (2011), and Yan et al. (2012) using equation (4.5). 
 
               (      )                                                                          (   )      
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It is assumed a crisis lasts for 5 years (Laeven and Valencia 2008; 2010; Caggiano 
and Calice, 2011). Thus, output losses (expected loss from a financial crisis) are 
measured as the cumulative gap between the real and trend real GDP. Trend real 
GDP is measured using the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter to the GDP series over a 20 
years period (Caggiano and Calice, 2011; Yan et al., 2012). 
 
Next, the probability of a crisis reduction is estimated by using equation (4.6) 
following the model of the BCBS (2010a). 
 
   (                                         )               (   ) 
 
where, 
TCA = ratio of total capital to total assets; 
LAR = ratio of cash and balances with the central bank plus securities over total 
assets; 
RHPG = real house price growth; and  
CGR = ratio of the current account balance over nominal GDP. 
 
4.6.4.1 Translating Capital to Asset Ratio into Regulatory Ratio  
The probability of crisis equation contains a capital to assets ratio (TCA) which is not 
a regulatory ratio; hence, it is to be translated into a regulatory ratio of Tier 1 capital 
ratio. Thus, the capital to assets ratio (TCA) is estimated for the additional Tier 1 
capital to risk-weighted asset ratio (TRA) requirement as prescribed in Basel III. In 
this way, TRA is to be mapped with the probability of a crisis to understand the 
relationship between TRA and the probability of a crisis, and thus any benefits 
associated with it. Therefore, the mapping is based on a simple pooled OLS 
regression (BCBS, 2010a; Caggiano and Calice, 2011) and is estimated without an 
intercept
24
 using equation (4.7). 
 
                                                                                                                   (   ) 
 
where,  
TCA = ratio of total capital to total asset ratio; and  
TRA = Tier 1 capital to risk -weighted asset ratio.  
                                                          
24
 The pooled OLS is run without intercept because conceptually if Tier 1 capital is zero, total capital 
to asset ratio would also be zero. 'β' represents the estimated proportion between Tier 1 capital ratio 
and total capital to total asset ratio. 
58 
4.6.4.2 Translating Bank Ratio of Cash Balance over Total Assets into NSFR  
Similarly, the ratio of cash balance over total assets (LAR) in equation (4.6) has been 
approximated for the additional requirements of NSFR as suggested in Basel III. 
Akin to capital ratio, the NSFR is to be mapped with the probability of crises, to 
understand the relationship between NSFR and the probability of a crisis, thus any 
benefits associated with it. The pooled OLS is estimated using the following equation 
(4.8), which again has no intercept. 
                                                                                                                 (   ) 
 
where,  
LAR = ratio of liquid asset to total asset; and  
NSFR = net stable funding ratio. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Several models have been employed to achieve the objectives of this thesis. In order 
to attain the first objective (i.e. to examine whether the resilience of the BRICS 
banks would increase or not due to the Basel III regulation), like in Laeven and 
Levine (2008), Abdel-Baki (2012) and Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014), a Z-score 
model is used. It is expected the Z-score model would explore the association 
between the Basel III regulation and the resilience of banks. Secondly, the loan 
pricing model would be utilized to explore how the Basel III standards, i.e. capital 
and liquidity affects the lending rate of banks, where loan pricing is used as the 
dependent variable whilst the cost of fund, operating cost, the cost of capital, capital 
adequacy ratio and liquidity ratio are used as the independent variables. With respect 
to previous studies, the model is unique in the sense that this thesis incorporates the 
Basel III norms (i.e. CAR and NSFR) into the same model to prove the Basel 
Committee's assumption. Finally, employing the BCBS models, this thesis assesses 
the costs and benefits of Basel III in the BRICS economies, which is of paramount 
importance for regulators of those economies to formulate common policies for all 
the economies in the BRICS. It is believed the methodology described in this chapter 





Analysis and Findings 
 
This section of the thesis presents the analysis and findings of the outputs of the 
models employed. Section 5.1 depicts an introduction of the chapter while  
Section 5.2 delineates the findings of the measurements of the resilience of banks. 
The outcome of the estimation of the impacts of capital and liquidity requirements on 
the loan pricing of banks is described in Section 5.3, and the assessment of costs and 
benefits of Basel III is provided in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.4 contains the 
conclusion of the chapter.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In an effort to improve the international financial stability, the BCBS provides 
regulatory guidelines (Basel framework) to control risks, which banks take beyond 
their risk-taking capacity. The fundamental essence of Basel III is banks must 
maintain a greater amount of capital and liquidity to absorb any potential losses. If 
banks hold adequate capital and liquidity, they would be more resilient in a crisis 
period and are thus better positioned to face extended shocks.  
 
The debate is maintaining a higher amount of capital and liquidity generates 
macroeconomic costs by impacting the price and availability of credit, and thereby 
altering the level of investment and output in the economy (BCBS, 2012). In effect, 
the additional costs of higher capital and liquidity requirements are passed on to 
borrowers in terms of higher interest rate on loans. Consequently, the demand of 
credit reduces resulting in a contraction in economic activity, which, in turn, 
slowdowns GDP growth or, even worse, deepens an economic recession (BCBS, 
2016).  
 
In addition, regulators argue an adequate amount of capital would make the financial 
system more stable and it would reduce the frequency and severity of future banking 
crises and the accompanying loss of GDP. Hence, higher capital and liquidity 
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requirements could generate social benefits by increasing GDP in the long run. With 
this background, the hypotheses as stated in Chapter 4 are tested in the following 
sections to achieve the objectives of this thesis.  
 
5.2 Measuring the Resilience of Banks  
In response to the global financial crisis of 2007 – 2008, the innovative approach of 
the BCBS has been to introduce new capital stability rules aimed at preventing any 
financial crises in the future. In fact, the increased levels of capital and liquidity 
requirements are at the heart of Basel III reforms. Specifically, the reforms would 
help banks raise their resilience in periods of stress by absorbing greater losses 
(BCBS, 2011). In effect, capital requirements enhance financial stability by reducing 
banks‟ incentives to take on excessive risks ex ante, and by making banks more able 
to absorb losses ex post. This section examines the impacts of the new rules of  
Basel III on the resilience (solvency) of the BRICS banks by estimating a Z-score 
model (Hypothesis 1). 
 
It is important to test for multicollinearity before a model is estimated (see 
descriptive statistics and unit root test results in Appendix 5.1 and Appendix 5.2, 
respectively). If the independent variables exhibit high collinearity among 
themselves, the regression results would be biased. Hence, in order to test for 
multicollinearity, a simple correlation matrix is constructed with the variables of the 
Z-score model. As depicted in Table 5.1, none of the variables has any 
multicollinearity problem except for the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital 
to risk-weighted asset ratio (TRA) and the leverage ratio (LEV). Therefore, three Z-
score models have been estimated by accounting for the multicollinearity problem. 
The first model includes the CAR, the second one includes the TRA, and the third 
model considers the LEV as the independent variable. Apart from the econometric 








Table 5.1: Correlation Matrix 
Variables
 
Ln(Z) CAR TRA LEV LCR NSFR LDR LTA LRE INF 
Ln(Z) 1          
CAR 0.255 1         
TRA 0.187 0.628 1        
LEV 0.392 0.686 0.772 1       
LCR 0.194 0.002 0.050 -0.027 1      
NSFR 0.107 0.062 0.010 0.057 0.316 1     
LDR 0.372 0.264 0.043 0.227 -0.382 -0.461 1    
LTA 0.454 -0.501 -0.448 0.581 -0.286 -0.151 -0.109 1   
LRE -0.117 0.004 -0.070 0.081 0.273 0.161 0.022 -0.326 1  
INF -0.243 0.241 0.093 0.189 0.187 0.011 0.197 -0.421 0.620 1 
Note: 
 Ln (Z) = Logarithm of Z-Score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA=Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Asset 
Ratio, LEV=Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LDR= Loan 
Deposit Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of Total Asset, LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate and INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, in order to test the first hypothesis of how Basel III increases 
the resilience of banks, a Z-score model is employed. The estimated results of the Z-
score models (i.e. resiliency test) are exhibited in Table 5.2, where the Z-score is the 
dependent variable whilst the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted asset ratio (TRA), leverage ratio (LEV), liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), net 
stable funding ratio (NSFR), bank attributes and country characteristics are the 
independent variables. However, as mentioned before, considering the 
multicollinearity problem and in order to distinguish the impact of various capitals as 
defined in Basel III, three models (Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3) have been 
estimated, where Model 1 estimates the Z-score model using the CAR, LCR and 
NSFR, whereas in Model 2 instead of CAR, TRA and in Model 3, LEV have been 






Table 5.2: Estimates of the Resilience of Banks 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z) 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model 








































































This table reports the results of Z-score model: 
 
Model - 1:                                                                     
 
Model - 2:                                                                     
 





Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Asset Ratio, 
LEV = Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of 
Total Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate, INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
Notes:  
1. Figures in parentheses are p-values 
2. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
In effect, the empirical testing of this thesis starts with estimating the pooled OLS 
and random effects model (results are reported in Appendix 5.2). The Breusch-Pagan 
Langrange multiplier test (see Appendix 5.3) suggests random effects models are 
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more appropriate than pooled OLS meaning that there are country specific effects in 
the data. This suggest estimating fixed effects model because it is possible to vary the 
country specific effects (intercept values) across the countries. Hence, in order to 
decide which one is an appropriate model in a panel study setting - fixed effects or 
random effects model, a Hausman test is performed. The purpose is to determine 
whether there is a significant correlation between the unobserved individual specific 
random effects (country specific effects) and the regressors. The result of the 
Hausman test is presented in Table 5.3, which demonstrates the corresponding 
effects are statistically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected  
(p-value = 0.0001) and the fixed effect model is preferred.  
 
Table 5.3: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test (Chi-Sq. Statistic) 
 




















57.36 7 0.0000 46.76 7 0.0000 64.66 7 0.0000 
Ho: Random Effect Model is Appropriate 
 
The estimates of the coefficients
25
 as reported in Table 5.2 show all the Basel III 
parameters, i.e. CAR, TRA and LEV, are statistically significant at the 1% level in the 
three models (Models 1, 2, 3) with expected signs. Similarly, the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) has got the expected sign in all the models and it is significant at the 5% 
level in Model 1 and at the 10% level in Model 3 but insignificant in Model 2. The 
LCR has the expected sign albeit it is not statistically significant in all the models. 
The reason might be this ratio was calculated in one-month horizons under the Basel 
norms. As the annual reports of banks have been used to calculate the LCR, year-end 
values were obtained, which are not suitable to measure the LCR. The inclusion of 
LCR in the model might give a better result if monthly data were used. However, the 
results indicate that a higher value of capital and liquidity signifies a higher degree of 
bank solvency. Thus, the Basel III regulation is vital to increase the resilience of the 
BRICS banks. 
                                                          
25
 The coefficients (slope) of fixed effects regression model do not vary across individuals or overtime 
which helps macro-prudential policy making to be effective. 
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The common intercept values of the three models are significant at the 1% level, 
which requires examining whether the differential intercept of each bank varies or 
not. The intercept of the fixed effects model in Table 5.2 is assumed to vary across 
banks and is time invariant. This is because each bank is different such as in terms of 
risk appetite, state of regulatory compliance, and ownership structure, which may 
remain unobserved. Hence, the compliance of Basel III regulation will have varying 
degrees of impact on the resilience due to the unobserved heterogeneity. In order to 
understand the role of individual banks to promote the resilience, Model 1 (the model 
with CAR) is re-estimated by including cross sections id in the model and the results 
are reported in Appendix 5.3. It is found the differential intercepts of all banks 
(except one) are statistically significant, meaning perhaps 43 banks are 
heterogeneous, and therefore, they might have divergent impacts on the resilience 
due to unobservables. Hence, the estimated parameters in Model 1, Model 2, and 
Model 3 may be suspected, which calls for performing diagnostic tests. 
 
5.2.1 Endogeneity Diagnostic Test 
It is indispensable to test the endogeneity problem in the estimated regression 
models. When the estimates are obtained with an endogeneity problem, the 
regression results would be biased. It is possible to have two types of endogeneity 
problem. First, the association between resilience and capital may be affected by a 
third unobservable bank characteristic. Second, results might be obtained due to the 
reverse causality. Apart from this, the results might be biased due to the possibility of 
omitted variables. Hence, three tests (i.e. the test of unobservables, the reverse 
causality test, and the omitted variable test) have been undertaken to check whether 
there is any bias in the estimated regression models. The details of these tests are 
described in the following sections. 
 
5.2.1.1 Test of Unobservables (Control Regression) 
It is possible the relationship between the resilience of banks (Z-score) and capital 
requirement is endogenously attained. That is, the resilience may be affected by a 
third unobservable bank characteristic. For example, the solvency of banks also 
depends on the banks‟ attitude toward risk or the risk profile of banks. Hence, if this 
were the case, the measurement of the relationship between the banks' resilience and 
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capital requirement would be biased. Thus, the possibility of biasedness would be 
addressed by following the methodology of Altonji et al. (2005), which also used by 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014). Both studies have recommended using the 
observed parameters to estimate bias produced by the unobservable in order to judge 
the strength of unobservables compared to the observables. 
 
The calculation methodology of testing this kind of problem starts with the 
assumption of two regressions; one is with a full set of variables and the other 
regression is with a restricted set of variables (restricted regression). The estimated 
coefficient for the full set of variables is referred as CF (where 'F' denotes full), 
whereas the coefficient with the restricted regression is conferred as CR (where 'R' 
denotes restricted). A ratio would then be computed using the coefficients of the 
restricted and unrestricted regressions. More specifically, the formula for calculating 
this ratio is CF/(CR – CF). When the value of (CR – CF) is small, the observables 
would be much stronger relative to the unobservables and the selection of 
unobservables is less likely to influence the effect away, and if CF were larger, the 
section of observables would be stronger compared to unobservables to take the 
effect away. Hence, the higher the ratio
26
, the less likely the model would be 
explained by unobservables.  
 
Applying this notion, the estimated parameters of control regression are reported in 
Table 5.4. The regressions have been estimated considering the three different 
definitions of capitals (CAR, TRA, and LEV) as the independent variables in the three 
models whereas the Z-score is the dependent variable. The ratio is calculated by 
taking the coefficients in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4. For example, the coefficient of 
CAR of Model 1 in Table 5.2 is 6.2380 and the same coefficient of the control 
regression in Table 5.4 is 6.3853. Hence, the ratio turns out to be 43.35 
[6.2380/(6.3853-6.2380)]. Likewise, the ratios of Model 2 and Model 3 are 17.82 and 
27.96, respectively, which are much higher than the benchmark ratio of 2. Thus, the 
unobservables in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 have to be 43.35 times, 17.82 times 
and 27.96 times stronger, respectively than the observables to explain the effect 
away, which is unlikely. Therefore, it seems very implausible the estimated 
                                                          
26
 The benchmark ratio in order to compare as suggested by Altonji et al. (2005) is at least 2. 
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association between the resilience and capital adequacy is affected by the 
unobservable variables. 
 
Table 5.4: Control Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z) 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model 






















43.35 17.82 27.96 
This table reports the results of Z-score model with control variables 
 
Model -1:                    ; Model -2:                    ;  Model -3:                    
 
where 
Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Asset Ratio, 
LEV = Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of 
Total Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate, INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
Notes:  
1. Values in parentheses are p-values 
2. *** denotes 1% level of significance. 
 
5.2.1.2 Reverse Causality Test 
The results might be obtained due to reverse causality. For instance, the resilience 
may lead to capital stability of banks. In this case, the causality would be reversed. In 
order to address the issue, the Z-score is re-assessed by considering the previous 
year's capital adequacy ratio. If the association is found significant, the direction of 
causality is running from the capital stability to resiliency, not vice versa 
(Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014). The results of the estimates are shown in  
Table 5.5. The results of all the models indicate the coefficients of capital stability 
are significant. Therefore, the results signify the models are not affected by the 
reverse causality; causality is running from the capital stability to the resilience 
(solvency) of banks. 
67 
Table 5.5: Reverse Causality Test 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z) 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model 








































































This table reports the results of Z-score model: 
 
Model -1:             (  )                                                        
Model -2:             (  )                                                        




Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Asset Ratio, 
LEV = Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of 
Total Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate, INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
Notes:  
1. Values in parentheses are p-values 
2. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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5.2.1.3 Testing the Possibility of Omitted Variables 
Although the results of the regression models are not influenced by the 
unobservables (not spurious and no endogeneity problem) yet, a test has also been 




Table 5.6: Analysis of Changes in Liquidity and Capital Stability 
 








































































 0.80 0.16 0.36 
F-statistic (P-value) 173.20 (0.0000) 2.19 (0.0000) 25.15 (0.0000) 
This table reports the test of omitted variables. The values of this table have been calculated by taking the first 
difference of the variables as reported in Table-5.2. 
 
Model  – 1:                                                                      
Model  – 2:                                                                       
Model  –  3:                                                                      
 
where,  
Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 Capital to Risk weighted Asset Ratio, 
LEV = Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of 
Total Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate, INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
Notes:  
1.  denotes first difference 
2. Values in parentheses are p-values 
3.  ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
69 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) have suggested the problem of omitted variables 
can be eliminated by examining differences in variables rather than levels, which 
removes the influence of omitted bank characteristics. The results of the three  
Z-score models of this notion are reported in Table 5.6, where the variables are 
differences rather than levels. The differences in the Z-score and other variables are 
made from one year to another. The coefficient of differences in the CAR and NSFR 
is positive and statistically significant, meaning that, an increase in capital and 
liquidity reduces the risk of default. In other words, an increase in capital and 
liquidity increases the solvency of banks. Similar findings have been reported by 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014). 
 
5.2.2 Impact of Basel III Requirements 
As the estimated models are robust, the coefficients of the models can now be used 
to examine the impact of Basel III. The following section describes the impact of 
higher capital and liquidity requirements on the resilience of banks in the BRICS 
economies. 
 
5.2.2.1 Impact of Higher Capital (Sensitivity Analysis) 
In order to understand to what extent the Basel III regulation, (i.e. CAR, TRA, and 
LEV) increases the solvency of banks, Table 5.7 is constructed, where the value of 
the Z-score has been calculated on the estimated parameters of the Z-score models 
(Models 1, 2, 3). Like in BCBS (2010a), the impact
27
 on the resilience of banks in 
terms of increasing the Z-score is tested by increasing the capital and leverage ratios 








                                                          
27
BCBS (2010a) has increased the ratio by 6% initially then extend it up to 15%. This thesis increases 
the requirement by 10%, which is the mid-value of 6% and 15%. 
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Z-score (%) for a 
10% increase in 
CAR 
Improvement in 
Z-score (%) for a 
10% increase in 
TRA 
Improvement in 
Z-score (%) for a 
10% increase in 
LEV 
Brazil 2.56 0.56 1.00 
China 2.18 0.48 0.91 
India 2.56 0.65 1.27 
Russia 2.42 0.53 1.24 
South Africa 2.87 0.86 1.58 
Overall 2.51 0.61 1.20 
The values of this table have been calculated using the parameters estimated in equation (4.2) of Chapter 4 as 
reported in Table 5.2 
 
   = 2.2783+6.2380*CAR+0.0151*LCR+0.0363*NSFR+0.0313*TA+0.0058*LD-0.0484*RER-0.3250*INF 
   = 2.9804+1.8893*TRA+0.0198*LCR+0.0297*NSFR+0.0407*TA+0.1436*LD-0.1681*RER+0.2460*INF 





Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 capital to Risk weighted asset, LEV = 
Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of Total 
Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate, INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
 
It is found from Table 5.7 a 10% increase in CAR, TRA, and LEV increases the 
solvency of banks in terms of increasing the Z-score by 2.51%, 0.61% and 1.2%, 
respectively. Hence, the CAR is robust to increase the resilience of banks. Therefore, 
compared to the TRA and LEV, the CAR
28
 significantly increases the resilience of 
banks. This finding is consistent with the findings by Abdel-Baki (2012). 
 
5.2.2.2 Impact of Liquidity Requirements (Sensitivity Analysis) 
The impact of holding additional liquidity on the solvency of banks is shown in 
Table 5.8. For a 10% increase in the NSFR in the three models (i.e., CAR, TRA, and 
LEV models), the Z-score of banks (solvency) varies from 0.09% to 0.18%. The 
impact of increased liquidity in increasing the resilience (solvency) of the BRICS 
                                                          
28
 The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) includes both the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals. "Tier 1 capital is a 
going concern capital whereas Tier 2 is expected to bear losses in case of insolvency" (Abdel-Baki, 
2012, p. 5). 
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banks is better in leverage ratio model (Model 3). That means, if the NSFR is 
implemented simultaneously with the LEV rather than with CAR and TRA, the 
resilience of banks would be expected to be greater. Therefore, the imposition of 
liquidity and leverage ratios would be an appropriate control in the regulatory regime 
of Basel III in response to the recent financial crisis. 
 
Table 5.8: Impact of Enhanced Liquidity Requirements on the Resilience of 
Banks (Sensitivity Analysis) 
 Improvement in 
Z-score (%) for a 




Z-score (%) for a 




Z-score (%) for a 
10% increase in 
NSFR 
(Model-3: LEV) 
Brazil 0.08 0.06 0.13 
China 0.14 0.11 0.22 
India 0.13 0.11 0.21 
Russia 0.11 0.09 0.17 
South Africa 0.11 0.09 0.18 
Overall 0.11 0.09 0.18 
The values of this table have been calculated using parameters estimated in equation (4.2) of Chapter 4 as 
reported in Table 5.2 
 
   = 2.2783+6.2380*CAR+0.0151*LCR+0.0363*NSFR+0.0313*TA+0.0058*LD-0.0484*RER-0.3250*INF 
   = 2.9804+1.8893*TRA+0.0198*LCR+0.0297*NSFR+0.0407*TA+0.1436*LD-0.1681*RER+0.2460*INF 
    = 2.7563+5.2864*LEV+0.0307*LCR+0.0581*NSFR+0.0311*TA+0.1399*LD-0.1273*RER+0.4351*INF 
 
where,  
Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 Capital to Risk weighted asset Ratio, 
LEV = Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of 






5.3 Measuring the Impact of Capital and Liquidity Requirements on Loan 
Pricing of Banks 
After the global financial crisis, there was a broad consensus amongst the regulators 
with others on the need to increase the level of capital and liquidity requirements for 
banks. There is no doubt this would make the banking sector safer by providing a 
better cushion against severe financial and economic shocks. However, banks might 
also respond to higher capital and liquidity requirements by increasing the lending 
rate or reducing credit (Elliott, 2009; BCBS, 2016). The analysis of previous 
literature suggests banks can opt for a combination of policies to adjust this expected 
rate of return on loans. In this regard, they can lower the cost of fund or increase 
efficiency by lowering operating costs or even reducing the return on equity (Elliott, 
2009; BCBS, 2010a). 
 
This section attempts to address the second objective of the thesis; to what extent is 
the loan pricing of banks affected by the additional capital and liquidity requirements 
imposed by the Basel III (Hypothesis 2). To this end, in assessing the loan price of 
banks, this thesis employs the Tier 1 capital ratio (TRA), net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR), the cost of fund (COF), the cost of operation (COO) and return on equity 
(ROE) as the independent variables whereas the loan price is the dependent variable.  
 
Table 5.9 depicts how the additional capital and liquidity requirements of Basel III 
affect the loan pricing of banks. The estimated parameters as reported in Table 5.9 
are the results of the cross-section fixed effects
29
 panel regression model since the 
Hausman test results (Table 5.10) reject the random effect model. As the 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests results suggest the loan pricing model is 
biased by the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems (see Table 5.12 and 
Table 5.13), the parameters of the loan-pricing model are estimated after rectifying 
the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems (standard errors are adjusted to 
account for clustering at the bank level) to make it robust. 
                                                          
29 To start with, this thesis employs a pooled regression model (see appendix 5.5). The F-value of the pooled 
regression suggests data can be pooled. Next, in order to choose between pooled OLS and random effect model, 
the Breusch-Pagan Langrange multiplier test is carried out. The p-value of the Breusch-Pagan Langrange 
multiplier test (reported in appendix 5.6) shows random effect model is better than pooled OLS. However, it is 
crucial to check whether the intercept value (country specific effect) in a random effect model varies or not. 
Hence, fixed effect model is required to estimate and if the p-value of the Hausman test is significant, random 
effect model is no longer appropriate over the fixed effect model. 
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Table 5.9: Impact of Higher Capital and Liquidity Requirements of Basel III on 
Loan Pricing of Banks 
 
Dependent Variable: Loan Price 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
Fixed Effect Model 


























This table reports the results of Loan Pricing equation: 
 





LP=Loan Price (lending rate), TRA=Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding 
Ratio, COF= Cost of Fund, COO=Cost of Operation, ROE=Return on Equity. 
 
Notes:  
1. Values in parentheses are p-values  
2. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 






Table 5.10: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 31.3943 4 0.0000 
Ho: Random Effect Model is Appropriate 
 
It can be seen from Table 5.9 all the variables have expected signs. The Tier 1 capital 
ratio (TRA), cost of fund (COF) and cost of operation (COO) are highly significant at 
the 1% level, whereas the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is significant at the 5% 
level. Thus, the capital ratio, liquidity ratio, the cost of fund, and the costs of 
operation significantly affect the loan pricing of banks. In particular, for a 1% 
increase in capital and liquidity, the loan price of banks increases by about 0.10% 
and 0.01%, respectively. The positive signs of COF and COO indicate the BRICS 
banks can adjust the increased cost by lowering the cost of fund (i.e. reducing deposit 
rate) and by increasing operating efficiency. The empirical evidence shows the 
reduction in COF of around 0.59% is sufficient to offset each percentage point 
increase in loan price, and for operating cost, it is about 0.31%. Although the return 
on equity (ROE) shows the correct sign, it has no impact on the loan pricing of the 
BRICS banks. Possibly, banks in the BRICS economies prefer to adjust the 
additional cost of Basel III requirements by adjusting the COF and COO while 
keeping shareholders return (ROE) unchanged. 
 
5.3.1 Diagnostic Tests 
In the previous section (i.e. Section 5.2.1), endogeneity diagnostic tests were 
performed to explore the robustness (Z-score model) of the impact of capital and 
liquidity on the resilience of the BRICS banks. In particular, the milticollinearity test, 
the test of unobservable variables, omitted variables, and reverse causality were 
employed to detect the endogeneity problem. In the loan-pricing model, apart from 
the multicollinearity and reverse causality test, other diagnostic tests such as 
autocorrelation and the heteroskedasticity test have been employed to check the 





5.3.1.1 Multicollinearity Test 
In a regression equation, the regressors are required to be independent and identical. 
If the coefficients are inflated by other regressors due to collinearity, the regression 
results would be biased. Hence, in order to understand the degree of collinearity 
among the regressors in the loan-pricing model, variance inflation factors (VIF) have 
been employed and the outcomes of the estimates are reported in Table 5.11. The 
estimates show the mean value of VIF is 1.44, which is less than the benchmark 
value of 10. Thus, it can be concluded there is no milticollinearity problem in the 
loan-pricing model. 
 
Table 5.11: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
TRA 1.84 0.543518 
NSFR 1.20 0.831485 
COF 1.19 0.841541 
COO 1.91 0.523895 
ROE 1.05 0.949505 
Mean VIF 1.44 
Note: 
TRA= Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, NSFR= Net stable funding ratio, COF= Cost of fund, 
COO= Cost of operation, ROE= Return on equity. 
 
5.3.1.2 Autocorrelation Test 
It is assumed in regression models the residuals would be independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d). If errors were serially correlated, the regression 
estimates would be biased due to the influence of confounding variables 
(unobservables). Thus, it is indispensable to perform the autocorrelation test. In this 
thesis, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation is undertaken and the F-test statistic 
has been reported in Table 5.12. The probability value (p-value = 0.000) of the test 





Table 5.12: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
Test Summary F. Statistic Prob. 
Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test 33.2320 0.0000 
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation 
 
 
5.3.1.3 Heteroskedasticity Test 
In a panel regression analysis, heteroskedasticity is a major concern amongst the 
researchers. It is assumed modelling errors would be uncorrelated and uniform, 
because if the true variance varies with the estimated effects, the results would be 
biased. Hence, the variances are expected to remain fixed (do not vary) with the 
effects being modelled. In order to detect the heteroskedasticity problem, this thesis 
employs the Modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity in a fixed effect 
regression model. The result of the Chi
2
 test statistic is shown in Table 5.13. The 
probability value of the test statistic suggests there is a heteroskedasticity problem in 
the model. 
 
Table 5.13: Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob.> Chi2 
Modified Wald Test  16000.99 0.0000 
H0: no heteroskedasticity problem 
 
5.3.1.4 Reverse Causality Test 
The estimated relationship between the loan price and capital adequacy might be 
obtained due to reverse causality. For instance, it is possible the lending rate would 
also affect the capital requirements of banks. If this were the case, the causality 
would be reversed. Hence, in order to address the problem, the capital adequacy of 
the earliest year is replaced with the loan price of the subsequent year. The idea is the 
loan price in the earliest year would not have resulted from the loan price in the 
subsequent year. If the relationship were found significant, the direction of causality 
would be running from the capital adequacy to loan price rather than vice versa. The 
results of the causality test are depicted in Table 5.14. The coefficients of capital 
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adequacy and liquidity are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively, which indicate reverse causality is unlikely. 
 
Table 5.14: Reverse Causality Test Results 
Dependent Variable 
Loan Price (LP) 











   0.8167*** 
(0.0000) 
COO 








This table reports the results of Loan Pricing equation: 
 





LP=Loan Price (lending rate), TRA(-1)=Lag Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio,  




1. Values in parentheses are p-values  
2. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
5.3.2 Impact of Higher Capital Requirements on Loan Price (Sensitivity 
Analysis) 
The previous diagnostic tests suggest the loan-pricing model is not biased by 
multicollinearity, misspecification bias, and reverse causality. However, the 
autocorrelation and the heteroskedasticity test statistics indicate the loan-pricing 
model is biased by the autocorrelation and the heteroskedasticity problems. 
Therefore, the loan pricing equation is estimated after rectifying the autocorrelation 
and the heteroskedasticity problems (see Table 5.9, Table 5.12 and Table 5.13). In an 
effort to assess the impact of an increase in bank capital as required by the Basel III 
on the loan price, the estimated parameters in the loan-pricing model (Table 5.9) are 
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used. Like in BCBS (2010a), the current level of TRA is raised by 6% at the starting 
point and goes up to 15%. While measuring the impact of increased capital 
requirements, other parameters of the loan-pricing model are kept constant. The 
results as shown in Table 5.15 suggest as the capital ratio increases, the loan price of 
banks also increases gradually. In fact, when the capital ratio increases by 6%, the 
lending rate increases by about 0.66% and for a 15% increase in capital ratio, the 
lending rate rises by about 1.65%. Hence, the higher capital ratio increases the loan 
pricing of banks. 
 
Table 5.15: Impact of Increases in Capital Ratio (TRA) on Lending Rate 
(Sensitivity Analysis) 











The values of this table have been calculated by using parameters estimated in equation (4.3) as reported in 
Table 5.9 
 
LP = 0.0358 + 0.0975*TRA + 0.0099*NSFR + 0.5866*COF + 0.3079*COO + 0.0025*ROE 
where, 
LP = Loan Price, TRA=Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, 
COF= Cost of Fund, COO=Cost of Operation, ROE=Return on Equity. 
 
5.3.3 Impact of Increased Liquidity (NSFR) Requirements on Loan Pricing 
(Sensitivity Analysis) 
Likewise, the impact of increases in the NSFR on the lending rate is measured using 
the parameters estimated in the loan-pricing model (see Table 5.9). The current level 
of NSFR is increased by 5%, 10% and so on up to 25% (BCBS, 2010a). Here again, 
other variables of the loan pricing model are kept constant and only the NSFR is 
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increased by the indicative percentages to assess the resulting impact on the loan 
price. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5.16. As shown in the table, 
for a 5% increase in NSFR, the associated change in the lending rate is about 0.59% 
and the lending rate increases to 2.94% when the liquidity ratio (NSFR) is raised by 
25%. Therefore, holding a higher amount of liquidity positively influences the loan 
price of banks in the BRICS economies. 
 
Table 5.16: Impact of Increases in NSFR on Lending Rate (Sensitivity Analysis) 






The values of this table have been calculated by using the parameters estimated in equation (2) of Chapter 4 
as reported in Table 5.9 
 




LP = Loan Price, TRA=Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, 
COF= Cost of Fund, COO=Cost of Operation, ROE=Return on Equity. 
 
5.4 Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Basel III 
Previous literature suggests the regulatory reform package of Basel III has 
macroeconomic costs because it would adversely affect the GDP by reducing credit 
supply in the economy (Barrell et al., 2009; Bank of Canada, 2010; BCBS, 2010a; 
MAG, 2010a; 2010b; Wong et al., 2010; Caggiano and Calice, 2011; Elliott et al., 
2012, Parcon-Santos and Bernabe, 2012; and Yan et al., 2012). Researchers also 
argue the higher capital and liquidity would carry economic benefits by bringing 
down the probability of a crisis (Caggiano and Calice, 2011; Yan et al., 2012). 
Therefore, in order to attain the third objective (i.e. to test Hypothesis 3 and 
Hypothesis 4) of the thesis, this section attempts to assess the potential 




5.4.1 Costs of Basel III Regulation 
In order to assess the macroeconomic costs, a panel regression model (Equation 4.4; 
i.e.                           ) is employed. The outputs of the panel 
regression model of the impacts of loan price on GDP are depicted in Table 5.17. 
The model is estimated after removing the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
problems (see Table 5.20 and Table 5.21) and the results are reported under the cross 
section fixed effects model
30
 since the Hausman test (Table 5.19) rejects the random 
effects model (p-value = 0.000). The dependent variable of the model is the natural 
logarithm of GDP whereas the independent variables are the loan price of banks and 
the real interest rate in the BRICS economies.  
 
Table 5.17: Estimation of the Impact of Loan Price on GDP 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
Fixed Effect Model  
(Cluster Adjusted by Banks) 
Variables Coefficient 
C 














This table reports the results of the impact of loan price on GDP: 
                            
where,  
Y= log real GDP, LP=Loan Price, RIR= Real Interest Rate 
Notes:  
1. Values in parentheses are P-values  
2. *** and **  denote 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
3. Cross-section clusters (banks) are adjusted to remove the potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
                                                          
30
 To start with, this thesis employs a pooled regression model (see appendix 5.5). The F-value of the pooled regression 
suggests data can be pooled. Next, in order to choose between pooled OLS and random effect model, the Breusch-Pagan 
Langrange multiplier test is carried out. The p-value of the Breusch-Pagan Langrange multiplier test (reported in 
appendix 5.6) shows random effect model is better than pooled OLS. However, it is crucial to check whether the 
intercept value (country specific effect) in a random model varies or not. Hence, fixed effect model is required to 
estimate and if the p-value of the Hausman test is significant, random effect model is no longer appropriate over the 
fixed effect model. 
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Table 5.18: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 14.9887 7 0.006 
Ho: Random Effect Model is Appropriate 
 
It is found from Table 5.17 the loan price (LP) of banks and the real interest rate 
(RIR) are significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The signs of both the 
variables are negative indicting the loan price and the real interest rate (RIR) both are 
negatively associated with GDP. In fact, for a 1% increase in loan price, GDP 
declines about 1.45% and for each percentage point increase in the real interest rate, 
GDP declines by 1.91%. 
 
5.4.1.1 Diagnostic Tests 
Akin to the previous sections (Section 5.2.1 and 5.3.1), in order to understand the 
robustness of the GDP model in a panel study setting, a multicollinearity test, 
autocorrelation test and a Heteroskedasticity test have been carried out.  
 
5.4.1.1.1 Multicollinearity Test 
As mentioned earlier, variance inflation factors (VIF) is a measure of the degree of 
collinearity amongst the regressors. VIFs explain how much of the variance of the 
estimated coefficients of the regressors are inflated due to the collinearity with the 
other regressors. It is assumed if the mean VIF is greater than 10 then collinearity 
exists among the independent variables. The results of the test are given in Table 
5.19. The mean value of VIFs shows there is no problem of multicollinearity in the 
GDP model. 
 
Table 5.19: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
LP 1.07 0.9379 
RIR 1.07 0.9379 
Mean VIF 1.07 




5.4.1.1.2 Autocorrelation Test 
One of the assumptions of regression models suggests the residuals would be 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). It is argued when errors are serially 
correlated then regression estimates would be biased due to the power of 
confounding variables (unobservables). Thus, it is crucial to remove the 
autocorrelation from the model. Hence, in order to detect whether the GDP model 
contains autocorrelation or not, the Wooldridge test of autocorrelation in panel data 
is carried out and the test statistic is given in Table 5.20. The probability value of the 
test statistic suggests there is an autocorrelation problem in the model. 
 
Table 5.20: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
 
Test Summary F. Statistic Prob. 
Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test 88.670 0.000 
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation 
 
 
5.4.1.1.3 Heteroskedasticity Test 
Another assumption in regression estimation is that the variances of the estimates 
would not vary with the effects being modelled. If the true variance varies with the 
estimated effects, the results would be biased. Hence, in order to verify whether the 
variances in the GDP model varies with the effects or not, the heteroskedasticity test 
has been performed and the results are shown in Table 5.21. The test statistic 
suggests heteroskedasticity is a concern in the GDP model.  
 
Table 5.21: Heteroskedasticity Test Statistic 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob.> Chi2 
Modified Wald Test  1465.07 0.0000 
 
H0: no heteroskedasticity problem 
 
5.4.1.2 Impact of Capital on GDP (Sensitivity Analysis) 
In order to understand how much additional capital would lead to  how much of an 
increase in the loan price and the associated impact on GDP, Table 5.22 is 
constructed, where change in lending rate is calculated on the basis of the parameters 
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estimated in equation (4.3) as reported in Table 5.9, i.e. LP = 0.0358 + 0.0975*TRA 
+ 0.0099*NSFR + 0.5866*COF + 0.3079*COO + 0.0025*ROE. Hence, change in 
capital level (TRA) is mapped with the loan price. Subsequently, for each level of 
capital (i.e. from 6% to 15%), the associated change in lending rate is made to 
observe the impact of lending rates on GDP based on the parameters estimated in 
Table 5.17 (autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are rectified in the model) 
 
Table 5.22: Impact of Increases in TRA on Lending Rate and GDP (Sensitivity 
Analysis) 
Increase in TRA (%) Change in lending rate (%) Change in GDP (%) 
6 0.658 -0.068 
7 0.768 -0.146 
8 0.878 -0.235 
9 0.989 -0.335 
10 1.098 -0.446 
11 1.207 -0.569 
12 1.317 -0.702 
13 1.427 -0.847 
14 1.537 -1.003 
15 1.646 -1.170 
Note: 
The values of this table has been calculated by using the estimated parameters in equations (4.3) and (4.4) of 
Chapter 4 as reported in Table 5.9 and 5.17.  
 
LP = 0.0358 + 0.0975*TRA + 0.0099*NSFR + 0.5866*COF + 0.3079*COO + 0.0025*ROE 
 
where,  
LP is Loan Price, TRA=Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, COF= 




Y = 14.6486 - 1.4582*LP - 1.9136*RIR 
 
where,  
Y= log real GDP, LP=Loan Price, RIR= Real Interest Rate 
 
It is found from Table 5.22 the lending rate (loan price) changes about 0.66% when 
the capital ratio is increased by 6%, and it is associated with a 0.07% decline in GDP. 
When the capital ratio increases by 15%, the positive impact on the lending rate is 
about 1.65%, which results in a 1.17% decline in GDP. Hence, the association 
between the capital regulation and lending rate is positive. The relationship, 
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however, is negative with GDP; meaning that capital ratio leads to an increase in the 
lending rate, which consequently, reduces the GDP. 
 
5.4.1.3 Impact of Liquidity on GDP (Sensitivity Analysis) 
Similarly, the impact of liquidity as measured by the NSFR is reported in Table 5.23. 
The table shows a 5% increase in NSFR increases the lending rate by 0.59% and the 
associated decline in GDP is 0.06%. When the capital ratio is raised from 10% to 
20%, the lending rate has increased from 1.18% to 2.35%, which leads to a decline in 
GDP from 0.18% to 0.60%. Thus, akin to the capital ratio, the relationship between 
liquidity ratio and lending rate is positive, but with GDP, the association is negative. 
The analysis indicates a higher liquidity does increase the lending rate resulting in a 
decline in the GDP. 
 
Table 5.23: Impact of Increases in NSFR on Lending Rate and GDP (Sensitivity 
Analysis) 
Increase in NFSR (%) Change in lending rate (%) Change in GDP (%) 
5 0.588 -0.060 
10 1.176 -0.180 
15 1.764 -0.359 
20 2.352 -0.597 
25 2.940 -0.896 
Note: 
The values of this table has been calculated using the parameters estimated in equations (4.3) and (4.4) of 
Chapter 4 as reported in Table 5.9 and 5.17. 
 
LP = 0.0358 + 0.0975*TRA + 0.0099*NSFR + 0.5866*COF + 0.3079*COO + 0.0025*ROE 
 
where,  
LP is Loan Price, TRA=Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, COF= Cost 
of Fund, COO=Cost of Operation, ROE=Return on Equity. 
 
Y = 14.6486 - 1.4582*LP - 1.9136*RIR 
where,  
Y= log real GDP, LP=Loan Price, RIR= Real Interest Rate 
 
5.4.2 Benefits of Basel III Regulation 
In order to estimate the benefits of higher capital and liquidity requirements the 
following formula - reduction in annual probability of crisis times the cumulative 
output (GDP) loss, where cumulative output loss is measured by HP filtering over 
the 20-year period, is considered (Eq. 4.5). When the frequency of crises declines, 
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output, which would have been lost, can be saved. This is treated as the benefit of 
reducing systemic risk (crises). The trend real GDP as measured by applying the HP 
filter yields an output loss of 30.67% for the BRICS economies.  
 
Like in BCBS (2010a), the probability of a crisis is calculated using equation (4.6) 
i.e.    (                                         ), where, P is 
the probability of a crisis, TCA is the ratio of total capital over total assets, LAR is the 
ratio of cash and balances with the central bank plus securities over total assets, 
RHPG is the real house price growth, and CGR is the ratio of the current account 
balance over nominal GDP. It is important to mention the ratio of capital to total 
asset (TCA) is the 'capital ratio' in the probability of crisis equation, which is not a 
regulatory ratio imposed by Basel III. Thus, the ratio TCA needs to be mapped with 
the Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted asset ratio (TRA), which is a regulatory ratio of 
Basel III and of interest to the thesis. Therefore, in order to map TCA with the TRA, 
like in BCBS (2010a), equation (4.7) has been applied, which is;             
  , where, TCA is the ratio of total capital to total asset ratio and TRA is Tier 1 capital 
to risk-weighted asset ratio. The equation is a simple pooled OLS and is estimated 
without intercept
31
. The results of the mapping show a TRA of 10% is approximately 
equivalent to a TCA of 8% and the associated reduction in the probability of a crisis 
is about 5.025%. 
 
The calculation of probability crises in Table 5.24 shows as the capital ratio 
increases, the reduction in the probability of crises becomes larger. For example, 
when the capital ratio increases from 6% to 10%, the reduction in probability of a 
crisis ranges from 3.015% to 5.025%. A further increase in the capital ratio to 15% 
reduces the probability of a crisis by 7.537%. Hence, the enhancement of capital base 
of banks ensures the economic stability by reducing crises in the economy. 
 
5.4.2.1 Impact of Capital on GDP (Sensitivity Analysis) 
After the mapping of capital ratio, it is possible to quantify the impact of an increase 
in regulatory capital ratio on the probability of crises and consequently, on output. 
For example, in order to estimate the impact of a 10% increase in TRA on output, the 
                                                          
31
 The rationale is if Tier 1 capital is zero then total capital would also be zero. 
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equation of "Benefit" would be employed. The calculation shows the benefit would 
be: 0.0525*0.3067 = 0.01541 = 1.541%. Likewise, the results of these impacts are 
depicted in Table 5.24. For a 6% increase in capital ratio, the probability of a crisis 
declines by 3.015% resulting in a 0.925% gain in the GDP. If the capital ratio is 
increased by 10%, the reduction in the probability of a crisis is 5.025% and the 
associated benefit in terms of an increase in GDP is 1.541%. Hence, the evidence 
shows the higher capital is associated with a reduction in crises and an increase in the 
GDP.  
 
Table 5.24: Impact of Increases in Capital Ratio (TRA) on Probability of Crisis 
and GDP (Sensitivity Analysis) 
Increase in TRA (%) 
Reduction in probability of 
crisis (%)
 Output gain (%GDP) 
6 3.015 0.925 
7 3.517 1.079 
8 4.020 1.233 
9 4.522 1.389 
10 5.025 1.541 
11 5.527 1.695 
12 6.030 1.849 
13 6.532 2.003 
14 7.034 2.157 
15 7.537 2.312 
Note: 
The values of this table have been calculated by using the following equations: 
 
   (                                         ) 
where,  
P is the probability of crisis, TCA is the ratio of total capital over total assets, LAR is the ratio of cash and balances with the 
central bank plus securities over total assets, RHPG is real house price growth, and CGR is the ratio of the current account 
balance over nominal GDP. 
and, 
Benefit = Output Gain = Δprob (crises) ×ΔGDP 
 
where,  
prob denotes probability and  signifies change 
 
5.4.2.2 Impact of Liquidity on GDP (Sensitivity Analysis) 
It is also assumed similar to capital; higher liquidity reduces the probability of crises 
and protects loss of GDP. Hence, in order to understand the impact of liquidity on the 
probability of a crisis (P) again equation (4.6) i.e.    (           
                              ), is employed. The only liquidity term in 
this probability of crisis equation is LAR, which is the ratio of cash and balances with 
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the central bank plus securities over total assets and is not a regulatory ratio. 
Therefore, it is important to map LAR with the regulatory ratio of Basel III. 
Accordingly, the LAR is mapped with the NSFR using equation (4.8) as suggested by 
the BCBS (2010a), i.e.                , where LAR is the ratio of liquid asset 
to total asset and NSFR is the net stable funding ratio. The mapping is again based on 
the ordinary pooled OLS and is run without intercept. 
 
Table 5.25: Impact of Increases in NSFR on Probability of Crisis and GDP 
(Sensitivity Analysis) 
Increase in NFSR (%) 
Reduction in probability 
of crisis (%) 
Output gain (%GDP) 
5 0.687 0.211 
10 1.374 0.421 
15 2.062 0.632 
20 2.749 0.843 
25 3.436 1.054 
Note: 
The values of this table have been calculated by using the following equations: 
 




P is the probability of crisis, TCA is the ratio of total capital over total assets, LAR is the ratio of cash and balances with the 
central bank plus securities over total assets, RHPG is real house price growth, and CGR is the ratio of the current account 
balance over nominal GDP. 
 
Benefit = Output Gain = Δprob (crises) ×ΔGDP 
 
where,  
prob denotes probability and  signifies change 
 
The estimates show a NSFR of 20% is roughly equivalent to a LAR of 5% and the 
associated reduction in the probability of a crisis is about 2.749%. Likewise, the 
reduction in the probability of crises associated with the increases in the NSFR from 
5% to 25% is calculated. Similar to the estimates of the impact of increases in capital 
levels on output, the impact of NSFR is measured. For example, a 20% increase in 
the NSFR is associated with a reduction in the probability of a crisis of 2.749%, 
which yields benefit of about 0.843% (0.0274*0.3067). Likewise, the outcomes of 
the estimates are reported in Table 5.25. It is found as the NSFR increase from 5% to 
25%, the reduction in the probability of a crisis rises from 0.687% to 3.436% and the 
associated benefit increases from 0.211% to 1.054%. Akin to the capital ratios, the 
relationships amongst the liquidity, reduction in the crises, and gain in GDP are 
positive. 
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5.4.3 Costs and Benefits of Basel III Compared 
Comparing the costs and benefits would reveal the long-term macroeconomic impact 
of capital and liquidity requirements of Basel III. Like in the BCBS (2010a),  
Table 5.26 shows the summary of the costs and benefits of the enhanced capital 
requirements. In effect, Table 5.26 depicts the benefits and costs for each rise in 
capital levels from 6% to 15% and the corresponding net benefits associated with it. 
As shown in Table 5.19, the net benefits increases from 0.857% to 1.156% when the 
capital ratio increases from 6% to 13%. However, the marginal net benefits are 
negative beyond the 13% capital level, i.e. if the capital is increased further to 15%, 
the net benefit reaches 1.142% (lower than 1.156%). Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the long-term net benefit of higher capital is positive for the BRICS economies 
up to a certain level; beyond that level, no benefits are achieved. These findings are 
consistent with the findings of BCBS (2010a; 2011), MAG (2010a; 2010b), and 
Caggiano and Calice (2011).  
 
Table 5.26: Expected Annual Benefits and Costs of Tighter Capital Ratios (in 
Terms of GDP Level) 








6 0.925 -0.068 0.857 
7 1.079 -0.146 0.933 
8 1.233 -0.235 0.998 
9 1.389 -0.335 1.054 
10 1.541 -0.446 1.095 
11 1.695 -0.569 1.126 
12 1.849 -0.702 1.147 
13 2.003 -0.847 1.156 
14 2.157 -1.003 1.154 
15 2.312 -1.170 1.142 
Notes: 
1. Expected benefits are reported from the Table 5.24 
2. Expected costs are extracted from the Table 5.22 
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Similarly, in order to assess the macroeconomic impact of NSFR, the cost and 
benefits are compared. The results are reported in Table 5.27. It can be seen from the 
table as the NSFR increases, the net benefits increase. In effect, when the NSFR is 
increased from 5% to 15%, the net benefits increase from 0.151% to 0.273%. A 
further increase in the NSFR to 20% produces a net benefit of 0.246%, which is 
lower than the benefits (0.273%) produced by 15% level of NSFR. Therefore, similar 
to the capital ratios, the net benefits of higher liquidity are also positive and are 
achieved if the liquidity is increased to a certain threshold level. This finding is also 
consistent with the findings of BCBS (2010a; 2011), MAG (2010a; 2010b), and 
Caggiano and Calice (2011). This is due to the fact that when banks increase 
additional funding from the owners, debt holders and depositors for the purpose of 
taking excessive risks, the costs of fund increase faster beyond a certain level as 
argued by Modigliani and Miller (MM) in the capital structure theory. Because due 
to taking excess risks, the marginal returns investors require are much higher than the 
initial required rare of returns. Therefore, higher costs as incurred by banks beyond 
the optimum capital level cause to decline the marginal benefits. Besides, the 
contribution of capital and liquidity to reduce the probability of crisis gradually 
becomes lower, which yields lower marginal benefits after certain level of capital 
and liquidity enhancement.  
 
Table 5.27: Expected Annual Benefits and Costs of Higher Liquidity 
Requirement (in Terms of GDP Level) 








5 0.211 -0.060 0.151 
10 0.421 -0.180 0.241 
15 0.632 -0.359 0.273 
20 0.843 -0.597 0.246 
25 1.054 -0.896 0.158 
Notes: 
1. Expected benefits are reported from the Table 5.25 




The empirical evidence of the Z-score model shows the capital and liquidity 
requirements are effective to increase the resilience of banks. As the higher amount 
of capital and liquidity is kept by banks, the solvency increases in the long run. Most 
importantly, the solvency of banks improves even more if banks concentrate on 
increasing the total capital; i.e. CAR. However, the role of NSFR to increase the 
solvency of banks is better with the LEV compared to the CAR and TRA. 
 
It is found from the loan-pricing model that the capital requirements significantly 
explain the loan pricing of banks. As stock of capital and liquidity increase, the loan 
price of banks also increases. However, banks in the BRICS economies can adjust 
the increased cost in several ways in order to keep the loan price unchanged. For 
example, for a 1% potential increase in the loan price, banks can reduce the cost of 
fund by about 0.59% and the cost of operation by 0.31%. 
 
The empirical evidence of the assessment of costs shows the association between 
capital/liquidity requirement and GDP is negative. As the holdings of capital and 
liquidity increase, GDP in the economy declines. In effect, for a 1% increase in the 
levels of capital from 6% to 7%, GDP declines by about 0.078% and with an increase 
of liquidity (NSFR) from 5% to 10%, GDP declines to -0.18% from -0.068%. 
 
However, additional capital also yields benefits in the economy by reducing the 
probability of a crisis and hence, protecting the GDP from declining. For a 1% 
increase in capital, the reduction in the probability of a crisis is about 0.502% and the 
accompanying benefits are 0.159%. For a 5% increase in liquidity, the reduction in 
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Figure 5.1: Net Benefits of Capital 
Regulation (% of GDP) 
Eventually, the net benefits of 
higher capital and liquidity 
requirements are positive for the 
BRICS economies. Figure 5.1 
highlights the net benefits increase 
from 0.857% to 1.156% when the 
capital ratio is increased from 6% 
to 13%. However, when the capital 
requirement is raised to 14%, the 
net benefits are 1.154%, which is 
lower than the benefits (1.156%) 
produced by 13% capital level. If the capital ratio is raised further, the net benefits 
continue to decrease. Thus, the marginal net benefits of the capital regulation are 
negative beyond the 13% capital levels.  
 
Similarly, when the NSFR is 
raised from 5% to 15%, the net 
benefits increase from 0.151% to 
0.273% as depicted in Figure 5.2. 
However, a further increase in 
NSFR to 20% produces a decline 
in net benefits to 0.246%. Hence, 
the net benefits are achieved up to 
a certain level of the increase in 
liquidity. After that point, the 
marginal net benefits of increasing liquidity are negative. Hence, there is an optimum 
level of NSFR, which maximises the net benefits in terms of GDP. 
 
In summary, the capital and liquidity requirements are effective to increase the 
resilience of banks. Although the Basel III implementing countries would incur 
macroeconomic costs, the regulations would produce macroeconomic benefits by 
reducing systematic crises in the economy resulting in an increase in GDP. The 
findings of this thesis are of particular interest to researchers, policy makers, 











5 10 15 20 25
NSFR (%) 
Figure 5.2: Net Benefits of Liquidity 







The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has highlighted the importance of effective 
banking regulations due to the fact many banks have collapsed during the recent 
financial crisis even though those banks have been Basel II compliant. The major 
causes of bank failure as revealed by the existing literature are inadequate capital 
stocks, a high degree of leverage, and poor liquidity buffers (Cannata and 
Quagliariello, 2009). Thus, taking the lessons from the global financial crisis, the 
flaws of Basel II have been rectified by the BCBS. Consequently, a new regulation, 
popularly known as the Basel III, has been introduced in 2010 by increasing the 
capital and liquidity standards for banks. Besides, the new Basel III framework 
contains a non-risk-based leverage ratio, which would act as a supplement to the 
risk-based capital requirements of banks. However, banks around the world are 
required to implement the Basel III regulation from 2013 (BCBS, 2011).  
 
The BCBS believes capital and liquidity requirements increase financial stability by 
reducing banks‟ incentives to take on excessive risks ex ante, and by making banks 
more able to absorb losses ex post. Indeed, the Basel III norms would improve the 
resilience of banks by increasing the quality and quantity of capital and liquidity 
(BCBS, 2011). The regulation is likely to bring down the probability of banking 
crises, and thus, it would save GDP (MAG, 2010a; 2010b; BCBS, 2010a). However, 
the higher capital and liquidity requirements would increase the overall cost of bank. 
Thus, it is likely the increased costs would be transferred to borrowers by increasing 
the lending rate, which would penalise the investment flows in the economy resulting 
in an adverse impact on GDP (Barrell et al., 2009; Elliot, 2009; BCBS 2010a; 2010b; 
Kato et al., 2010; MAG, 2010a; 2010b; Caggiano and Calice, 2011; Gambacorta, 
2011; Yan et al., 2012). Hence, it is critical to investigate whether the benefits of 
Basel III regulation are higher than the costs. Besides, the Basel III regulation is 
likely to "ensure a level playing field" (BIS, 2014, p. 1) in all banking operations 
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across countries. The question arises as to what extent this universally binding 
regulation is appropriate for the already highly regulated emerging market 
economies, particularly the BRICS economies (Abdel-Baki, 2012; AfDB, 2012).  
 
Researchers argue most empirical investigations on the Basel III regulation focus on 
the needs of the advanced economics (Suttle et al., 2010). Hence, the circumstances 
of the BRICS and emerging market economies have been overlooked (Suttle et al., 
2010) though the BRICS economies have also suffered from the consequences of the 
global financial crisis in 2007-08 (Banerjee and Vashisth, 2010). Hence, it is crucial 
to examine the effectiveness of Basel III regulation to increase the resilience of 
banks. It is equally important to assess the macroeconomic impacts of Basel III 
regulation to formulate common policies for the BRICS economies. 
 
The broad objective of the thesis was to investigate the impending effects of Basel III 
on the BRICS economies. More specifically, the first objective was to examine the 
resilience of banks due to the enhanced capital and liquidity requirements. The 
second objective was to assess the impacts of the higher standards of capital and 
liquidity on the lending rate of banks, and finally, the thesis attempted to measure the 
economic costs and benefits of additional capital and liquidity requirements in the 
BRICS economies. 
 
The thesis used secondary bank level and macroeconomic data from 2007 to 2014 in 
order to perform the analysis. The bank level data were collected from the annual 
reports of 43 banks in the BRICS countries while the macroeconomic data were 
gathered from the Datastream – a commercial source of macroeconomic data. Panel 
regression models were employed to test the hypotheses, and hence, to achieve the 
objectives of the thesis. 
 
6.2 Main Findings of the Thesis 
The analysis of the Z-score model reveals the higher capital and liquidity 
requirements of Basel III increase the resilience (solvency) of banks in the BRICS. 
Specifically, it is found the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital ratio, 
leverage ratio (LEV) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) are statistically significant 
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to increase the solvency of banks. That is, as the higher amounts of capital and 
liquidity are kept by banks, the solvency increases in the long run. These findings are 
very similar to the findings of Laeven and Levine (2008), Angora and Roulet (2011), 
Abdel-Baki (2012), Chalermchatvichien et al., (2014). Apart from this, the thesis 
puts forward a new finding; compared to Tier 1 capital and leverage ratio, the 
solvency increases the most when banks focus on increasing the capital adequacy 
ratio. This is very relevant because during the economic woes the Tier 2 capital 
(component of the CAR) acts as an additional safeguard with the Tier 1 capital. As a 
result, banks become more solvent and shock resilient. This finding is consistent with 
the study by Abdel-Baki (2012). In his study, it is stated "Tier 2 capital is expected to 
bear losses in case of insolvency" (Abdel-Baki, 2012, p. 5). Further, empirical 
evidence of this thesis shows the impact of NSFR to increase the resilience is higher 
with the leverage ratio than the impact comes from the capital adequacy ratio and 
Tier 1 capital ratio. This thesis is unique in the sense it uses a regulatory and risk-
based measure of capital (i.e. CAR) while calculating the Z-score, and incorporates 
all the Basel III norms in the study, which were missing in the previous studies. 
 
The findings of the loan-pricing model discover capital and liquidity requirements 
significantly increase the lending rate of banks. Banks in the BRICS economies 
increase the lending rate in order to cover the costs of holding additional capital and 
liquidity. For a 1% increase in capital and liquidity, the lending rate increases by 
about 0.10% and 0.01%, respectively. It is found, however, banks can adjust those 
additional costs by reducing the cost of fund and operating cost. For example, for a 
1% potential increase in loan price, banks can reduce the cost of fund by about 
0.59% and cost of operation by 0.31%. The results are consistent with the findings of 
Elliott (2009), the MAG (2010a), the BCBS (2010a) and King (2010). The novelty of 
this thesis, in this case, is the methodological contribution to the loan pricing 
equation, which establishes the argument of the BCBS (2010a) by incorporating the 
liquidity component in the model. 
 
The results of costs and benefits analysis indicate the implementation of Basel III has 
been costly for the BRICS economies. For instance, when capital ratio is raised from 
6% to 7%, GDP of those economies declines by about 0.078% and increasing the 
liquidity ratio from 5% to 10%, the GDP declines from -0.068% to -0.18%. 
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Furthermore, it is found that higher levels of capital also generate economic benefits 
in the form of reducing the probability of a crisis, and hence, safeguards GDP loss. 
Specifically, for a 1% increase in capital from 6% to 7%, the reduction in the 
probability of a crisis reaches 3.517% from 3.015% and the associated benefits 
increase from 0.92% to 1.079%. Similarly, an increase of the liquidity from 5% to 
10%, the reduction in the probability a crisis increases from 0.687% to 1.374% and 
the accompanying benefits increase from 0.211% to 0.421%. 
 
The comparison between the costs and benefits reveals the net benefits of Basel III 
are positive for the BRICS economies. The net benefits increase from 0.857% to 
1.156% when the capital ratio is raised from 6% to 13%. However, the marginal net 
benefits of capital standards are negative beyond the 13% capital levels. Similarly, 
when the NSFR is raised from 5% to 15%, the net benefits increase from 0.151% to 
0.273% and a further increase in NSFR to 20% produces a decline in the net benefits 
of 0.246%. Hence, the net benefits of Basel III would be obtained when capital and 
liquidity standards are raised up to a certain level because after that level, the 
marginal net benefits of increasing the capital and liquidity are negative. It is 
important to mention that these findings are similar to the findings of the BCBS 
(2010a), the MAG (2010a), Angelini et al., (2011), Caggiano and Calice (2011), 
Gambacorta (2011), Locarno (2011), Parcon-Santos and Bernabe (2012), and Yan et 
al., (2012). This thesis provides new evidences to policy makers of the BRICS 
economies and fills the gap in the previous literature. 
 
6.3 Policy Recommendations for Banks 
After scrutinizing the results, the following recommendations for banks have been 
enumerated.  
 
 Banks should focus on increasing the capital adequacy ratio rather than 
focusing only on the Tier 1 capital. The empirical evidence of this thesis 
shows compared to Tier 1 capital and leverage ratio, the capital adequacy 
ratio significantly improves the resilience of banks. This is very crucial 
because the two components of the capital adequacy ratio, i.e. Tier 1 capital 
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is a „going concern capital‟ whereas Tier 2 capital tolerates losses in the 
event of insolvency.  
 
 The findings of this thesis indicate the lending rate of banks increases with 
the increase in addition capital and liquidity. Hence, if banks aspire to gain 
competitive advantage, they might achieve operating efficiency by reducing 
the operating costs. Eventually, this would reduce the lending rate and offset 
the increased costs of Basel III regulation. Another avenue to offset the 
additional costs of capital and liquidity is to reduce the costs of fund. In this 
case, banks might focus on mobilizing low-cost deposits such as current 
account and short notice deposits. 
 
 Banks should be cautious about their investment and lending activities during 
the implementation phase of Basel III. Because, the empirical evidence shows 
GDP reduces due to implementing the Basel III regulation, which may 
negatively affect the business environments of banks, causing an adverse 
impact on their profitability.  
 
6.4 Policy Recommendations for Regulators 
Based on the analysis and findings, the thesis offers the following policy 
recommendations for regulators: 
 
 In order to increase the solvency of banks in the BRICS economies, 
regulators may impose the capital, liquidity and leverage standards of the 
Basel III regulation because the empirical evidence shows those standards 
significantly increase the solvency/resilience of banks. However, regulators 
might also formulate pragmatic policies to increase the capital adequacy ratio, 
particularly Tier 2 capital, not emphasizing only to raise the Tier 1 capital. In 
this case, the specific guidelines of the Basel III can be consulted. 
 
 It is found the impact of NSFR on increasing the resilience of banks is more 
effective combined with the leverage ratio than the impact with capital 
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adequacy ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio. Hence, regulators might concurrently 
impose the NSFR and leverage requirements on banks. 
 
 It is revealed the higher capital and liquidity requirements increase the 
lending rate of banks. Hence, in order to keep the lending rate unchanged, the 
regulators of the BRICS economies might devise specific policies to regulate 
the costs of fund and costs of operation. If these costs are managed, banks can 
adjust or offset the costs of holding additional capital and liquidity. 
 
 The analysis of costs and benefits suggests the benefits of higher standards of 
capital and liquidity are achieved up to a certain level of increments in capital 
and liquidity, for this reason, regulators should be vigilant in setting the 
standards of capital and liquidity. Hence, during the implementation period of 
Basel III, the capital and liquidity requirements should be increased 
gradually. 
 
6.5 Limitation of the Study 
This thesis has shed light on the impending impacts of Basel III norms, which is 
scheduled to be phased in from 2013 to 2018. The actual results could not be known 
due to the paucity of secondary data. Thus, the results of the thesis should be read as 
the perceived impacts of Basel III regulation. This thesis does not cover the non-
banking financial institutions and shadow banking, which constitute a major part in 
any financial system, hence, the policy implications of this thesis should be 
considered only in a banking context.  
 
6.6 Future Research  
This thesis is based on secondary sources of information obtained from websites of 
respective banks. Qualitative information, such as experts', regulators' and 
practitioners' opinions would certainly supplement the findings of the thesis. Apart 
from this, the inclusion of non-bank financial institutions or shadow banking to 
represent the entire financial system could have improved the reliability of the 
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results. This thesis could not address these limitations due to the time constraints. 
However, this thesis leaves these areas for future research.  
 
As the thesis relies on the annual reports of banks, only year-end information is 
available. This kind of information is not suitable for calculating the LCR because it 
requires data that are more granular. Hence, future research could be undertaken by 
more accurately incorporating the LCR.  
 
Further, volatility in GDP is a very common phenomenon in many economies. This 
thesis does not consider volatility in the GDP series. Thus, the assessment of costs 
and benefits of Basel III might be conducted in the future by considering the 
volatility of GDP in the BRICS economies. Finally, future research might investigate 
and explore how the Basel III affects the banks' solvency and macroeconomic 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
 
Appendix 4.1: Measurement (variables) Used in Previous Literature 
 
Author(s) Name Measurement (Variable) Used 
Laeven and Levine (2008); Abdel-Baki (2012); 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014); Vazquez and 
Federico (2015). 
 
Z-Score (Measured by CAR 
plus ROA divided by the 
standard deviation of assets 
returns) 
 
BCBS (2010a); King (2010); Angora and Roulet 
(2011); BCBS (2011); Vallascas and Keasey (2012); 
Noss and Toffano (2016). 
 




BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); Gambacorta (2011); 
Locarno (2011); Yan et al. (2012). 
 
Tier 1 capital ratio (TRA) 
 
 
Laeven and Levine (2008); Angelini et al. (2011); 
Caggiano and Calice (2011); Abdel-Baki (2012); 
Cummings and Wright (2015). 
 




BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); Abdel-Baki (2012). 
 
Leverage ratio (LEV) 
 
BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); BCBS (2011); Abdel-
Baki (2012); Gobat et al. (2014); Chalermchatvichien 
et al. (2014); Vazquez and Federico (2015). 
 




BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); King (2010); BCBS 
(2011); Angora and Roulet (2011); Abdel-Baki (2012); 
Yan et al. (2012); Gobat et al. (2014); 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014); Vazquez and 
Federico (2015). 
 






Laeven and Levine (2008); Angora and Roulet (2011); 
Abdel-Baki (2012); Vallascas and Keasey (2012); 






Abdel-Baki (2012). Loan deposit ratio (LDR) 
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Appendix 4.1: (Continued) 
 
Author(s) Name Measurement (Variable) Used 
Elliott (2009); BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); King 
(2010); Caggiano and Calice (2011); Gambacorta 
(2011); Slovik and Cournède (2011); Parcon-Santos 
and Bernabe (2012); Santos and Elliott (2012); Yan et 
al. (2012); Cummings and Wright (2015). 
 






Elliott (2009); BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); Santos 
and Elliott (2012). 
 
Cost of fund (COF) 
 
 
Elliott (2009); BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a). 
 
 
Cost of operation (COO) 
 
Elliott (2009); BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); King 
(2010); Kashyap et al. (2010); Caggiano and Calice 
(2011); Gambacorta (2011); Yan et al. (2012); Bernabe 
and Jaffar (2013). 
 







Real exchange rate 
 






BCBS (2010a); MAG (2010a); Angelini et al. (2011); 
Caggiano and Calice (2011); Gambacorta (2011); 
Locarno (2011); Parcon-Santos and Bernabe (2012); 
Roger and Vitek (2012); Yan et al. (2012); Bernabe 








Caggiano and Calice (2011); Gambacorta (2011);  
Yan et al., (2012). 
 










Current account balance to 
GDP 
 
BCBS (2010a). Liquid asset ratio (LAR) 
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Appendix 4.2: Components of Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
 
Available stable funding (sources) Factor Required stable funding (uses) Factor 
Items  Items  
Capital instruments  100% Cash, banknotes, central bank 
reserves and unencumbered loans to 
banks < 6m. 
0% 
 
Stable deposits of retail customers 





Less stable deposits of retail 
customers (non-maturity or residual 
maturity <1 yr) 
 
90% 
Unencumbered HQLA securities < 
1 year: Debt issued or guaranteed by 
sovereigns, central banks, BIS, IMF, 
EC, multilateral development banks, 
non-central government, with a 0% 
risk weight under Basel II 
standardized approach 
5% 
   
Unencumbered Level 2a and 2b 
securities: unencumbered non-
financial senior unsecured corporate 
bonds and covered bonds rated at 
least AA-, and debt that is issued by 
sovereigns, central banks, and PSEs 
with a risk weighting of 20% 
(maturity 6 month to 1 year) and 
listed equity securities or non-
financial senior unsecured corporate 
bonds (or covered bonds) rated from 
A+ to A−, maturity ≥1 year. 
 
50% Other Deposit & Short Term 
Borrowing:  
wholesale funding provided by non-
financial corporate customers, 
sovereign central banks, multilateral 
development banks and PSEs (non-
maturity or residual maturity 6 
months to 1 year) 
50% 
 
Long term borrowing (funding) 















All other liabilities and equity not 
included above 
0% Other assets 100% 
 
Off-balance sheet 5% 












































































Ln(Z) 3.67 3.67 5.29 0 0.87 -0.56 3.36 20.2 344 
CAR 0.15 0.14 0.28 0.07 0.03 1.15 4.58 112 344 
TRA 0.12 0.1 0.27 0 0.06 3.88 3.53 125 344 
LEV 0.08 0.07 0.24 0.02 0.04 1.56 5.63 239 344 
LCR 0.87 0.7 2.89 0.04 0.57 0.92 3.38 50.7 344 
NSFR 1.22 1.23 2.99 0.26 0.36 0.96 6.69 248.1 344 
LD 0.96 0.88 2.15 0.17 0.33 0.93 3.96 63.08 344 
LTA 17.55 17.62 21.92 11.48 2.21 -0.23 2.77 388 344 
RER 2.69 2.49 4.2 0.54 1.15 -0.29 1.8 25.38 344 
INF 0.06 0.06 0.14 0 0.03 0.12 3.05 89 344 
LP 0.10 0.09 0.38 0.03 0.05 2.3 9.39 888 344 
COF 0.04 0.04 0.25 0 0.03 6.86 91.06 1138 344 
COO 0.04 0.03 0.24 0 0.04 3.59 19.97 4871 344 
ROE 0.14 0.15 0.32 0 0.06 -0.21 2.85 282 344 
RIR 0.06 0.03 0.39 -0.03 0.10 2.12 6.1 396 344 
Ln(Z) = Natural Logarithm of Z-score; CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio; LEV = Leverage Ratio, LCR = Liquidity Coverage Ratio; NSFR = Net Stable Funding 
Ratio; LD = Loan Deposit Ratio; LTA = Logarithm of Total Assets; RER = Real Exchange Rate; 
INF = Inflation Rate (CPI); LP = Loan Price; COF = Cost of Fund; COO = Cost of Operation; 


















Levin, Lin & Chu t 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square 














Z-score -8.10*** 0.000 -0.688 0.245 109.15** 0.047 214.06*** 0.000 
CAR -8.20*** 0.000 -2.729** 0.003 123.68*** 0.005 218.98*** 0.000 
TRA -29.10*** 0.000 -7.579*** 0.000 203.22*** 0.000 265.01*** 0.000 
LTA -16.80*** 0.000 -6.075*** 0.000 201.25*** 0.000 200.93*** 0.000 
LDR -4.41*** 0.000 -2.072** 0.019 131.76*** 0.001 104.76* 0.083 
LLP -14.19*** 0.000 -6.256*** 0.000 185.12*** 0.000 178.43*** 0.000 
INF -41.89*** 0.000 -11.031*** 0.000 266.62*** 0.000 154.65*** 0.000 
LCR -12.33*** 0.000 -2.084** 0.019 124.13*** 0.005 149.59*** 0.000 
LEV -5.30*** 0.000 -0.420 0.337 102.63 0.107 156.07*** 0.000 
NSFR -20.65*** 0.000 -3.192*** 0.001 144.22*** 0.000 171.13*** 0.000 
LRE -9.95*** 0.000 1.028 0.848 71.65 0.867 130.30*** 0.002 
Notes:  
1. CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, LTA=Logarithm of Total 
Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, LLP=logarithm of Loan Loss Provision, INF= Inflation (CPI), 
LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, LEV=Leverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LRE=Logarithm of 
Real Exchange Rate. 
2. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 























Appendix 5.3: Estimation of Resilience of Banks (Pooled OLS and Random 
Effect Model) 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z) 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 


































































































































This table reports the results of Z-score model: 
 
Model - 1:                                                                     
 
Model - 2:                                                                     
 





Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, TRA = Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Asset Ratio, 
LEV = Leverage Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of 
Total Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate, INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
Notes:  
1. Figures in parentheses are p-values 
2. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Appendix 5.4: Estimation of Resilience of Banks - Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects 














779.61 0.0000 751.85 0.0000 713.76 0.0000 





Appendix 5.5: Estimation of the Impact of Capital and Liquidity on Loan 
Pricing of Banks (Pooled OLS and Random Effect Model) 
 
Dependent Variable: Loan Pricing (LP) 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Model 







































This table reports the results of Loan Pricing equation: 
                                                     
 
where,  
LP=Loan Price (lending rate), TRA=Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio, NSFR=Net Stable Funding 
Ratio, COF= Cost of Fund, COO=Cost of Operation, ROE=Return on Equity. 
 
Notes:  
1. Values in parentheses are p-values  
2. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Appendix 5.6: Estimation of the Impact of Capital and Liquidity on Loan 
Pricing of Banks - Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random 
Effects 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob. 
Cross-section random 415.65 0.0000 




Appendix 5.7: Estimation of the Impact of Loan Price on GDP (Pooled OLS and 
Random Effect Model) 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Model 
























This table reports the results of the impact of loan price on GDP: 
 
                            
 
where,  




1. Values in parentheses are P-values  





Appendix 5.8: Estimation of the Impact of Loan Price on GDP - Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob. 
Cross-section random 889.80 0.0000 
Ho: Pooled OLS model is appropriate 
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Appendix 5.9: Estimation of Individual (Bank) Effects (Differential Intercept) 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Z) 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 - 2014 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 344 
 






LCR  0.0151 
(0.223) 


















Votorantim  -0.7017*** 
(0.000) 
Agricultural Bank 1.0180 *** 
(0.000) 
Bank of China 1.8381*** 
(0.000) 
Construction Bank 1.3715*** 
(0.000) 
Development Bank China 1.0131 *** 
(0.000) 
Merchants Bank 1.4444*** 
(0.000) 
Hua Xia Bank 0.6396*** 
(0.000) 
Minsheng Bank 0.6019 *** 
(0.000) 
This appendix is continued on the next page 
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Appendix 5.9: (Continued) 
 
Variables Individual (Bank) Effects 
Coefficients 
HuiShang Bank 0.9674 ***   
(0.000) 
Industrial and Commercial Bank  1.1295***     
(0.000) 
Axis Bank 0.9072***    
(0.000) 
Bank of India 0.5498***  
(0.000) 
City Union Bank 2.0289***    
(0.000) 
HDFC Bank 1.0658*** 
(0.000) 
ICICI Bank 0.7327***  
(0.000) 
IndusInd Bank 0.0415 
(0.665) 
Kotak Mahindra  0.3333***  
(0.001) 
Panjab Bank 0.4280***  
(0.000) 
State Bank of India 1.4632***  
(0.000) 
Yes Bank 1.1709***  
(0.000) 
Bank ZENIT 0.3323***  
(0.000) 
Bank of Moscow  -0.7516***  
(0.000) 
Gazprombank -1.4659***  
(0.000) 
Nomos Bank  0.1988** 
(0.017) 
Promsvyazbank   0.2042** 
(0.014) 
Raiffeisenbank -0.2385***  
(0.005) 
Rosbank  -1.0132***  
(0.000) 
Sberbank  -0.3581***  
(0.000) 
Unicredit  0.3310***  
(0.000) 
Globex -1.4245***  
(0.000) 
This appendix is continued on the next page 
 
122 
Appendix 5.9: (Continued) 
 
Variables Individual (Bank) Effects 
Coefficients 
MDM Bank -1.0828***  
(0.000) 
Bidvest Bank  -0.7803***  
(0.000) 
Capitec Bank  -0.5502***  
(0.000) 
FirstRand Bank  0.7436***  
(0.000) 
Nedbank 0.9127***  
(0.000) 
Standard Bank  1.3976***  
(0.000) 
Teba (Ubank) -0.8704***  
(0.000) 
Mercantile Bank -0.2378***  
(0.006) 
This table reports the results of Z-score model: 
 
                                                              




Z= Logarithm of Z-score, CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio, LCR=Liquidity Coverage Ratio, 
NSFR=Net Stable Funding Ratio, LTA=Logarithm of Total Asset, LDR= Loan Deposit Ratio, 
LRE=Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate, INF= Inflation (CPI). 
 
Notes:  
1. Values in parentheses are p-values 
2. ***and ** denote 1%, and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
